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THROUGH THE WIRE ACT
John T. Holden*
Abstract: Legalized sports gambling has become one of the hottest topics in state
legislatures ever since the United States Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Murphy v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n1 allowed states to begin legalizing the activity. As states began to
offer sports wagering, gambling became front and center in the news and the Trump
administration’s Justice Department took the opportunity to rewrite a 2011 Office of Legal
Counsel opinion, expanding the scope of the most prominent federal anti-gambling statute.
The re-interpretation of the scope of the Wire Act reversed the Department of Justice’s position
that the statute only applied to interstate sports wagering, and instead incorporated all forms of
interstate wagering. The new interpretation is exceptional because it follows years of failed
legislative attempts to re-write the statute. The executive branch used this interpretation to
circumvent the legislature and expand the scope of the statute.
The nature of the Wire Act’s targeted activities is one of many questions surrounding a
statute that was applied for decades with few questions. The rise of the internet has brought on
many more questions regarding the scope of the Wire Act—questions that have become
prescient in an era of expanded legal gambling. This Article analyzes the most significant
questions regarding the application of the Wire Act and suggests that contrary to the
Department of Justice’s 2018 opinion, the statute is intended to apply to a very small group
of activities.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the end of World War II, American politicians prepared for
a spike in crime.2 There was a notable pattern of increased criminal
incidents after major American conflicts like the Revolutionary War, the
Civil War, and World War I.3 But the post-World War II years were
different. Despite a minor rise in murders during the 1950s, there was no
national crime wave as one might anticipate.4 However, while crime was
not on the rise, gambling was.5 A number of theories emerged as to why
gambling spiked following the Second World War, ranging from people
having more money than they did during the pre-war Great Depression
years, to Nihilism centering around the Atomic age and the threat of
nuclear war, which prompted people to live the best life they could before
the Cold War turned hot.6
Despite being largely illegal, gambling was on the rise during the postWorld War II years; one poll in 1950 found that more than 57% of

2. DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMING PROHIBITION AND THE INTERNET 46 (2005).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 46–47.
6. Id. at 47.
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Americans had paid to participate in a game of chance.7 Although reliable
data on the value of the illegal gambling market during this time is
uncertain, estimates from the early 1950s ranged from around $1 billion
to $8 billion.8 The numbers, even if hyperbolic as estimated, attracted the
attention of Congress, which took a particular interest in the assumed
association between organized crime and gambling.9 This concern would
prompt a near-decade-long process to enact legislation that specifically
targeted organized crime’s money-making operations, the most notable of
which at the time was indeed gambling.10 The federal Wire Act would be
passed in 1961 and mark the first major statute to specifically target sports
wagering on the federal level.11
The Wire Act was at the time of its passage the crowning achievement
of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s war on organized crime; but for
many years, the statute was largely unfamiliar to those outside of the
criminal law field. Until the internet came to be in virtually every home
in America, few bothered to consider the exact scope of the statute and
whether it applied to gambling activities other than sports wagering.12 In
2001, the Eastern District of Louisiana,13 and subsequently the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, held that the Wire Act applied only to sports
wagering and not to activities like online casino games.14 Despite the Fifth
Circuit’s ruling, the scope of the Wire Act remained uncertain to some.
Such was the case until Illinois and New York sought guidance from the
Justice Department as to whether the online sale of lottery tickets would
offend the statute.15 In 2011, the Department of Justice concluded that the
7. Id. (citing a poll conducted by George Gallup that showed a 12% rise in gambling over the
previous five years).
8. Id. at 48. Estimating the size of the illegal gambling market remains an issue to this day, with
some estimates putting the size of the illegal sports gambling at upwards of $400 billion; but, in
reality, this is unknown and virtually impossible to measure. See Jordan Weissmann, Big Bucks or
Bogus Betting Baloney?, SLATE (Nov. 21, 2014, 2:19 PM), https://slate.com/business/2014/11/adamsilver-says-theres-400-billion-per-year-of-illegal-sports-betting-in-the-u-s-alone-seriously.html
[https://perma.cc/PAY6-RHKG].
9. G. Robert Blakey, Legal Regulation of Gambling Since 1950, 474 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 12, 13–14 (1984).
10. See Brett Smiley, Mailbag Mythbusting: The Wire Act and Sports Betting, Explained, SPORTS
HANDLE (May 30, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/mailbag-mythbusting-the-wire-act-and-sportsbetting-explained [https://perma.cc/FH72-MA72].
11. Transmission of Wagering Information Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961).
12. See generally In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001).
13. Id. at 480–81.
14. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262–63 (5th Cir. 2002).
15. See VIRGINIA A. SEITZ, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHETHER
PROPOSALS BY ILLINOIS AND NEW YORK TO USE THE INTERNET AND OUT-OF-STATE TRANSACTION
PROCESSORS TO SELL LOTTERY TICKETS TO IN-STATE ADULTS VIOLATE THE WIRE ACT (Sept. 20,
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Wire Act only applied to sports betting, and this opinion on the law would
remain the primary guidance on its scope for seven years.16
In 2018, the Justice Department, under the Trump administration,
rescinded the previous guidance and issued a new interpretation of the
Wire Act’s scope.17 The new interpretation determined that the statute
applies to a variety of online gambling activities beyond sports
wagering.18 The new opinion followed several years of failed efforts,
purportedly backed by casino magnate and Republican Party donor
Sheldon Adelson, to legislatively override the Justice Department’s 2011
opinion and pass a law banning all online gambling.19 The new opinion
was put on hold for ninety days by Deputy Attorney General Rod
Rosenstein in order to allow companies to come into compliance;20 but in
the interim, the 2018 opinion was challenged by the New Hampshire
Lottery, who asked for an injunction and declaratory relief, as states
across the country looked for clear guidance.21 The New Hampshire
plaintiffs prevailed at the district court in a narrow decision tailored to the
facts of the case and the plaintiffs’ specific circumstances.22
Despite the New Hampshire District Court’s ruling, many questions
remain regarding the scope of the Wire Act. While the application of the
statute to sports betting has never been in doubt, many questions arise as
to exactly whose sports betting activities are implicated by the statute, as
well as where exactly online betting can take place.23 Following the
2011) [hereinafter SEITZ MEMO], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/09/3
1/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/V37R-5S3T].
16. See STEVEN A. ENGEL, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECONSIDERING
WHETHER THE WIRE ACT APPLIES TO NON-SPORTS GAMBLING 1 (Nov. 2, 2018) [hereinafter ENGEL
MEMO], https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1121531/download [https://perma.cc/AK72-YUU3].
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Matthew Boyer, Sheldon Adelson and His Astroturf Lobbyists Don’t Want to Let You Gamble
Online, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 6, 2017, 6:27 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/sheldonadelson-and-his-astroturf-lobbyists-dont-want-to-let-you-gamble-online [https://perma.cc/LRD5-3T9B].
20. Letter from Deputy Att’y Gen. to U.S. Attorneys, Assistant Att’ys Gen., & Dir., Fed. Bureau
of
Investigation
(Jan.
15,
2019)
[hereinafter
DAG
Wire
Act
Letter],
https://www.justice.gov/file/1124286/download [https://perma.cc/7C96-APJJ].
21. See N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Barr, 336 F. Supp. 3d 132, 136 (D.N.H. 2019); Eric Ramsey, New
Hampshire Lottery Sues DOJ Over Wire Act Opinion, ONLINE POKER REP. (Feb. 15, 2019,
8:34 AM), https://www.onlinepokerreport.com/35298/nh-lottery-doj-wire-act-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/J5P7-ML28].
22. Barr, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 157 (“The parties nevertheless disagree as to whether a declaratory
judgment should be limited to the parties or have universal effect. The plaintiffs maintain that
declaratory relief ‘necessarily extends beyond the [Commission] itself.’ The Government contends
that any declaratory relief must apply only to the parties to the case. I agree with the Government.”
(internal citations omitted)).
23. For instance, one common question is whether the intermediate routing of data that exceeds the
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Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n,24 which opened the doors for states to begin legalizing sports
wagering after more than two decades of prohibition, the interest in
legalizing sports betting has never been higher.25 In the first year since the
decision in Murphy, more than twenty states have introduced legislation
to allow sports wagering within their borders; however, like an albatross
around their necks, questions regarding just who is implicated and what
activities are covered by the Wire Act are causing pause for states to
legalize the most lucrative form of sports wagering, mobile wagering.26
This Article addresses many of the key questions surrounding the scope
of the Wire Act and the intent of the statute’s authors. It does so in five
parts. Part I discusses the current status of the Wire Act and the history of
efforts to overturn the 2011 Department of Justice opinion. Part II
analyzes the legislative history of the Wire Act, and the many evolutions
of the language in the act. Part III evaluates many of the most pressing
questions surrounding the scope of the Wire Act including who is in the
business of betting27 and where the statute’s safe harbor provision
applies.28 Part IV deliberates the potential application to sub-segments of
the sports betting industry that have largely avoided Wire Act scrutiny,
namely the daily fantasy sports industry and those entities that sell data,
which facilitates the operation of sportsbooks. Finally, Part V discusses
some minor amendments that could better position the Wire Act for a
world with expanding legal sports gambling.

jurisdiction of a state that allows mobile betting should trigger the Wire Act’s reach by being interstate
in nature. See Robert Fisher & Christopher Queenin, High Wire Act: The DOJ Creates Uncertainty
in the Budding Online Gambling Industry by Reversing Course on the Applicability of the Wire Act,
NIXON PEABODY (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2019/02/04/highwire-act [https://perma.cc/Z9QM-FZDD].
24. 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
25. Id. at 1484–85. See also generally John T. Holden, Prohibitive Failure: The Demise of the Ban on
Sports Betting, 35 GA. ST. L. REV. 329 (2019) (discussing the evolution of the regulation of sports betting).
26. See Steve Bittenbender, Tennessee Legislators Punt Online Sports Betting Bill, Cite Wire Act
Questions, CASINO.ORG (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.casino.org/news/tennessee-legislators-punton-online-sports-betting-bill [https://perma.cc/CED8-AZAN].
27. The Wire Act applies specifically to those “engaged in the business of betting or wagering.” 18
U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2018).
28. The Wire Act exempts “the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or foreign country where betting on that sporting
event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in which such betting is legal.” Id. § 1084(b).
However, it remains uncertain whether information that passes through a third state, where such
information is illegal, violates the Wire Act.
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DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE WIRE ACT

The federal government’s increased attention on sports gambling
can be traced to the 1950s, with the establishment of the Kefauver
Committee, which was tasked with investigating and providing
recommendations to combat the perceived growth of organized crime.29
In order to combat organized crime, the federal government sought to
target the money-making businesses of organized crime.30 The Wire Act
criminalized the transmission of wagering information across state lines
by those in the business of betting.31 The simplicity of the statute’s text
and the elements required for a Wire Act claim generated few challenges
to the scope of the statute from the date of passage until the widespread
availability of the internet, as most cases involved the placing of sports
wagers via telephone.32 The Wire Act states as follows:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering
knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers
or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any
sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or
credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in
the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.33
The Wire Act targets two separate types of activities: (1) the
transmission of information or communications for placing bets; and
(2) the transmission of information for payment related to gambling.34 The
specific application of the Wire Act to those in the business of betting, as
opposed to casual gamblers, had indeed been one of the more complex
questions regarding the Wire Act, until the internet era prompted novel
questions to be raised.35

29. See generally WILLIAM H. MOORE, THE KEFAUVER COMMITTEE AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME
1950-1952 (1974); U.S. SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, A History of Notable Senate Investigations:
Special Committee on Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Kefauver.htm
[https://perma.cc/6MFG-WFN4].
30. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 2.
31. The Interstate Wire Act of 1961, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2018).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.R.I. 1981). However, the outer limits of
the business of betting qualification of the Wire Act have not been clarified.
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In re Mastercard

The modern questioning of the scope of the Wire Act likely originated
around 1997, with the uncertainty as to whether websites that hosted
online casinos implicated the Wire Act and the first hearings on internet
gambling.36 These modern issues about the scope of the Wire Act would
initially culminate in the 2001 case, In re Mastercard.37 In that case, the
Eastern District Court of Louisiana was the first court to address the
question of whether the Wire Act applied to activities other than sports
betting.38 The case was consolidated in Louisiana’s Eastern District after
Larry Thompson and Lawrence Bradley brought class actions against the
major credit card networks, Visa and Mastercard, as well as several of
their issuing banks, alleging that the companies were in violation of a
variety of statutes, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act for facilitating payments to online casinos that
allowed for illegal gambling.39
While these men were concerned citizens, they were also gamblers:
Brady was charged more than $7,000 for his “purchases” at online
casinos, and Thompson was charged $1,510 by Mastercard.40 The
plaintiffs accused Visa and Mastercard of actively directing American
customers to participate in and aid and abet offshore “bookmaking
activities in the United States where they are not legal.”41 The court
addressed a variety of claims raised by the plaintiffs in the credit card
companies’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.42
Prior to dismissal, District Judge Duval addressed the Wire Act claims
raised by the plaintiffs.43 Visa and Mastercard argued that the plaintiffs’
failure to allege that they wagered on sports was a “fatal defect” to their

36. See, e.g., The Internet Gambling Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Tech.,
Terrorism, and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2–3 (1997). The Senate
held a hearing and proposed legislation in order to clarify the Wire Act, stating that the statute applies
to all forms of wagering, not simply sports wagering, but also that the statute incorporates the internet
within its scope, a question that was uncertain at the time. See id.
37. 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001).
38. See Elizabeth A. Walsh, In re MasterCard International, Inc.: The Inapplicability of the Wire
Act to Traditional Casino-Style Games, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 445, 447 (2002).
39. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 473–74.
40. Id. at 474 (noting that the plaintiffs’ complaints state that they were charged as though the
casino transactions were purchases as opposed to cash advances).
41. Id. at 475.
42. Id. at 497.
43. Id. at 479.
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Wire Act claims.44 The district court held that “a plain reading of the
statutory language clearly requires that the object of the gambling be a
sporting event or contest. Both the rule and the exception to the rule
expressly qualify the nature of the gambling activity as that related to a
‘sporting event or contest.’”45 Providing more support for the court’s plain
reading, the plaintiffs had apparently relied on the first clause of the
statute, which directly included the sporting events or contests language.46
Judge Duval cited the then-ongoing efforts by Congress to amend the
Wire Act to incorporate non-sports-gambling activities within the scope
of the statute, as well as the legislative history of the statute. In jettisoning
the Wire Act claims, the district court stated that the “[p]laintiffs’
argument flies in the face of the clear wording of the Wire Act and is more
appropriately directed to the legislative branch than th[e] Court.”47 The
plaintiffs, however, were not inclined to support the new legislation and
instead appealed the dismissal of their claims to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals.48
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit was unanimous in upholding the lower
court’s dismissal of all of the plaintiffs’ claims.49 In addressing the
plaintiffs’ claims using the Wire Act as a predicate offense to find a
violation of the RICO Act, the Fifth Circuit panel said: “[w]e agree with
the district court’s statutory interpretation, its reading of the relevant case
law, its summary of the relevant legislative history, and its conclusion.”50
The Fifth Circuit opinion in the In re Mastercard case remained the
primary judicial guidance on the application of the Wire Act in the
internet-era;51 however, questions remained about which clauses of the
Act applied only to sporting events, especially as states began to explore
the prospect of online lottery sales.52

44. Id. at 480.
45. Id. at 480.
46. United States v. Lombardo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279–80 (D. Utah 2007) (noting that the In re
Mastercard Court’s analysis was not actually necessary to its determination of the defendants’ motions as
the defendants did appear to engage in some conduct that would still implicate the Wire Act).
47. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 481. Indeed, Judge Duval’s statement is perhaps
more pertinent now than in 2001 given the recent efforts by the executive branch to re-write the scope
of the statute via an Office of Legal Counsel memo. See infra section I.E.
48. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002).
49. Id. at 264.
50. Id. at 262–64.
51. Id. at 264. A prior case had concluded that information associated with sports wagers was a
required element for a Wire Act claim, though prior to widely available internet access. See United
States v. Marder, 474 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th Cir. 1973).
52. See generally SEITZ MEMO, supra note 15.

08 Holden.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]
B.

5/30/20 11:47 PM

THROUGH THE WIRE ACT

685

The 2011 Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum

In a memorandum dated September 20, 2011, the Office of Legal
Counsel, an office of the Department of Justice that opines on legal
questions, issued an opinion on the scope of the Wire Act and its potential
application to the use of the internet to sell lottery tickets to in-state adults
using out-of-state transaction processors.53 The author of the
memorandum, Assistant Attorney General Virginia Seitz, begins by
noting that it is the Office of Legal Counsel’s conclusion that “interstate
transmissions of wire communications that do not relate to a ‘sporting
event or contest,’ fall outside of the reach of the Wire Act.”54 The impetus
for the opinion was that Illinois and New York desired to sell lottery
tickets online, but concerns arose over the interstate routing of transaction
data.55 While the states concluded that the action would not offend the
Wire Act, the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division referred the
matter to the Office of Legal Counsel for an opinion on the matter.56
Secondary concerns were also raised as to whether the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA)57 may permit criminal
conduct that the Wire Act prohibits.58
The Seitz memorandum notes that while there is “sparse case law”
addressing the Wire Act’s scope, with cases construing the statute both
narrowly and broadly, the statute should only be applied to the
“transmission of communications related to bets or wagers on sporting
events or contests.”59 The Seitz memorandum divides the Wire Act into
two broad clauses. The first clause prohibits:
[A]nyone engaged in the business of betting or wagering from
knowingly using a wire communication facility ‘for the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers
or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any
sporting event or contest.60
The second clause prohibits a person from knowingly utilizing a wire
facility to transmit information that “entitle[s] the recipient to ‘receive
money or credit’ either ‘as a result of bets or wagers’ or ‘for information

53. Id.
54. Id. at 1 (internal citations omitted).
55. Id. at 1–2.
56. Id. at 3.
57. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2018).
58. Id. at 2–3.
59. Id. at 3–4.
60. Id. at 4.
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assisting in the placing of bets or wagers.’”61 The question for the Office
of Legal Counsel to resolve was whether the “sporting event or contest”
requirement applied only to the second part of the first clause or if the
requirement ran through the entirety of the two clauses.62
The Seitz memorandum concluded that the most plausible reading of
the statute was that the “sporting event or contest” language modified the
transmission language.63 A broader reading of the scope of the prohibition
would raise serious questions as to why Congress included the “sporting
event or contest” language if it intended to prohibit all bets or wagers
otherwise within the scope of the statute’s language.64 Similarly, it was a
logical interpretation that Congress would desire the two clauses to have
a “parallel” scope and for both to be restricted to betting or wagering
associated with “sports event[s] or contest[s].”65
The Office of Legal Counsel memorandum then examines the Wire
Act’s legislative history, seeking to determine the intentions of Congress
fifty years prior.66 The Office of Legal Counsel memorandum highlighted
the comma placement in an earlier version of the bill.67 The comma
placement made clear that the sporting event phrase modified both the
“bets or wagers” phrase and the “information assisting in the placing of
bets or wagers.”68 The commas were removed when the class of
individuals targeted by the statute changed to those involved in gambling
businesses.69 However, nothing in the subsequent legislative history
suggested an intent to redefine the rest of the scope of the statute.70
While the phrase “sporting event or contest” is not present in the Wire
Act’s second clause, the memorandum concludes that the reliance on
“bets or wagers” is a shorthand reference to the entire phrase in clause
one, which includes the “sporting event or contest” language.71 The
conclusion that the Office of Legal Counsel reached was that it was
“Congress’s overriding goal in the Act to stop the use of wire
communications for sports gambling in particular.”72 As further evidence
61. Id.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id. at 8.
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that Congress specifically included sports betting within the Wire Act to
the exclusion of other gambling activities, the memorandum cites the
Wagering Paraphernalia Act, enacted the same year as the Wire Act,
which enumerates a number of gambling activities covered and
distinguishes these activities from the conduct in the Wire Act.73 Despite
the 2011 memorandum, the limitation of the Wire Act to “sporting events
or contests” would be questioned a short time later in 2015, as members
of Congress would first seek to legislate on the scope of the Wire Act.74
C.

Restoration of America’s Wire Act

The period after the 2011 Wire Act opinion left some members of
Congress feeling that the Wire Act had been misinterpreted by a
“misguided,” partisan Justice Department.75 Despite allegations that the
2011 memorandum was partisan, both political parties supported a
legislative dismantling of the opinion, with Republican Lindsey Graham
and Democrat Dianne Feinstein championing the bill, Restoration of
America’s Wire Act (RAWA).76 Congress aimed to modernize the Wire
Act’s scope to ban not only sports wagering but virtually all forms of
online gambling.77 The purported driving force behind RAWA was not
the Senators who introduced the bill, but Las Vegas Sands Corporation
and casino magnate Sheldon Adelson, who has long opposed online
gambling as a threat to his casino business.78 Several early efforts were
made to introduce RAWA legislation, with each failing to reach major
milestones in the congressional process.79
D.

Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n

As Congress questioned new Justice Department appointees about
whether the Wire Act opinion should be revisited, New Jersey was
challenging the constitutionality of a partial ban on states’ ability to
73. Id. at 11.
74. See Restoration of America’s Wire Act, H.R. 707, 114th Cong. (2015).
75. See Press Release, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Graham Statement on Justice
Department’s Restoration of Wire Act (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/r
eleases/graham-statement-on-justice-departments-restoration-of-wire-act [https://perma.cc/G5KZZ3YG] (blaming the Wire Act opinion on the Obama Administration’s Justice Department).
76. See id.; Restoration of America’s Wire Act, H.R. 707, 114th Cong. (2015).
77. See Chris Grove, The Restoration of America’s Wire Act—Inside the Proposed Ban on
Regulated Online Gaming, ONLINE POKER REP. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.onlinepokerreport.co
m/11725/graham-chaffetz-introduce-anti-online-gambling-bill [https://perma.cc/67F6-SS9G].
78. See id. (reporting that early drafts of RAWA, originally titled the Internet Gambling Control
Act, identified it as originating from Adelson lobbyists).
79. Id.
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authorize sports wagering.80 The Murphy case challenged Congress’s
ability to stop state legislators from both passing new legislation and
repealing existing legislation.81 In 1992, Congress passed the Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).82 Whereas the Wire Act
relied on the Commerce Clause to prohibit gambling that crosses state
lines,83 the PASPA filled the gap that the Wire Act left unregulated—it
directly banned states from authorizing new sports wagering schemes
even if the transactions remained entirely within state lines.84 New Jersey
initially challenged the law by attempting to pass a law authorizing sports
wagering, but was rebuffed by the Third Circuit.85 The state then
attempted to partially repeal its laws banning sports gambling, which led
to the Supreme Court granting review.86
The Supreme Court found that by restricting the state’s ability to repeal
laws that it had previously passed, Congress violated the anticommandeering principle and intruded into New Jersey’s sovereign
jurisdiction.87 While Justice Alito held that Congress had the power to ban
sports wagering in totem, he said it could not dictate that state legislators
do so on behalf of Congress.88 The finding that PASPA was
unconstitutional opened the door for states across the country to begin
passing laws legalizing sports wagering, and to begin competing with
Nevada—a state that had held a virtual monopoly on legal sportsbook
style betting since 1992.89 Even prior to the Supreme Court’s decision,
states began preparing for a future date that would allow them to offer
80. See John T. Holden, Regulating Sports Wagering, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3370584 [https://perma.cc/ZVV2-DGNT].
More specifically, New Jersey argued that the PASPA unconstitutionally commandeered the state
legislature to maintain a ban on sports wagering that the state no longer desired. The State argued that
this requirement imposed by the PASPA was not a valid preemption exercise by the federal
government and was incompatible with the Supreme Court’s decisions in New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 499–506 (D. N.J. 2014).
81. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1471 (2018).
82. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (1992).
83. The PASPA was also passed as Commerce Clause legislation, as it was suggested that intrastate
gambling had an impact on interstate commerce. See Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act–Policy Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 13–14 (1992).
84. See generally Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting Has an Equal Sovereignty
Problem, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2017) (discussing the potential equal sovereignty problems with
sports betting regulations).
85. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 214–15 (3d Cir. 2013).
86. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471–73.
87. Id. at 1481–82.
88. Id.
89. See Holden, supra note 80, at 7–9.
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sports wagering, either as a result of a Supreme Court decision or
congressional repeal.90 The Murphy decision, however, has catalyzed the
movement of states seeking to legalize sports wagering, with more than
thirty introducing legislation since the beginning of 2018;91 and
accompanying many of these bills has been the desire to include mobile
betting. The rise in sports betting legislation and general discussion of
increasing access to gambling generally was met with a new
memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, reversing the
2011 opinion.92
E.

The 2018 Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum

Years after RAWA was first introduced, the Wire Act was ascribed
new meaning.93 In November 2018, the Justice Department issued its
latest memorandum on the subject, Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act
Applies to Non-Sports Gambling.94 The memorandum, authored by the
Office of Legal Counsel’s Assistant Attorney General Steven A. Engel,
enabled the executive branch to accomplish what the legislative branch
had failed to do.95 The twenty-three-page memorandum explains that the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice asked for the Office of
Legal Counsel to reconsider the 2011 opinion, as it purportedly
represented a departure from the Department’s previous prosecutorial
policy.96 The memorandum concluded that all but one of the Wire Act’s
prohibitions bars conduct beyond sports wagering.97
The 2018 memorandum concluded that the 2011 opinion erred in
reading the “sporting event or contest” to run through both clauses in their
entirety, which was a departure from the prosecutorial approach that was

90. Id.
91. Dustin Gouker, Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP.,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker [https://perma.cc/VE9N-DGBZ] (last
updated Jan. 11, 2020).
92. ENGEL MEMO, supra note 16; Dustin Gouker, Department of Justice Reverses Wire Act Opinion
that Said Law is Limited to Sports Betting, ONLINE POKER REP. (Jan. 21, 2019, 3:31 PM),
https://www.onlinepokerreport.com/34391/doj-new-wire-act-opinion [https://perma.cc/3X22-8NTX].
93. Tom Hamburger, Matt Zapotosky & Josh Dawsey, Justice Department Issues New Opinion
that Could Further Restrict Online Gambling, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2019, 7:47 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/justice-department-issues-new-opinion-that-couldfurther-restrict-online-gambling/2019/01/14/a501e2da-1857-11e9-8813cb9dec761e73_story.html?utm_term=.1118271998cc [https://perma.cc/JV9R-UH2X].
94. ENGEL MEMO, supra note 16.
95. Id. at 1–2.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2.

08 Holden.docx (Do Not Delete)

690

5/30/20 11:47 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:677

taken prior to the 2011 opinion.98 Successful prosecutions for activities
beyond sports gambling were cited as a basis for asserting a broad scope
of the Wire Act in the 2018 memorandum, in addition to a challenge to
the 2011 opinion regarding the ambiguity of the statute.99 The second
memorandum relied on “[t]raditional canons of statutory construction” to
determine the following: “[i]n construing the reach of modifiers like ‘on
any sporting event or contest,’ the default rule is that ‘a limiting clause or
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase
that it immediately follows.’”100 The grammatical structure and placement
of the commas led the 2018 memorandum to conclude that the first clause
prohibits sports wagering via its second prohibition, but its first
prohibition is not so limited and incorporates additional activities.101
The Wire Act’s second clause, which lacks a reference to sports
gambling, was thus reinterpreted in 2018 to apply to a variety of forms of
gambling. There was no necessity to interpret the “sporting event or
contest,” modifier as running parallel through both clauses.102 Relying
again on Lockhart, the 2018 memorandum concluded in regards to the
second clause that it would be structurally inappropriate to extend the
“sporting event or contest” language at the end of the first clause forward
through the entirety of the first clause and down through the entirety of
the second clause where the language does not appear.103 The
memorandum opined on the scope of the prohibition by stating the
following: “[i]n sum, the linguistic maneuvers that are necessary to
conclude that the sports-gambling modifier sweeps both backwards and
forwards to reach all four of section 1084(a)’s prohibitions are too much
for the statutory text to bear.”104
In justifying an application of the “statute as written,” the memorandum
concluded that the application of “sporting event or contest” lacked the
“patent absurdity” necessary to conduct an investigation beyond the
text.105 The 2018 memorandum concluded it was improbable that
Congress would have not wanted to include bets and wagers in nonsporting events as well.106 The 2018 memorandum dismisses the Seitz
memorandum’s analysis that when Congress revised the statute, it
98. Id. at 11.
99. Id. at 4–7.
100. Id. at 7 (citing Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 958, 962 (2016)).
101. Id. at 10–11.
102. Id. at 11.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 13–14.
105. Id. at 14.
106. Id. at 10–11.
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intended only to modify the language regarding which enterprises were
incorporated, and not the wholesale expansion of the statute.107 In addition
to its new conclusions regarding the scope of the Wire Act, the Office of
Legal Counsel also opined on the interaction between the Wire Act and
the UIGEA, an issue that the Seitz memorandum determined was mooted
by the opinion on the Wire Act’s scope.108 The memorandum determined
that the UIGEA is not impacted by the Wire Act, and vice versa.109 This
new Wire Act interpretation was met with surprise and exasperation in
many parts of the country that had relied on the 2011 opinion to offer
various forms of online gambling that in one respect or another relied on
interstate transmissions. As a result, the Justice Department implemented
a ninety-day compliance period.110
F.

The New Hampshire Case

The New Hampshire Lottery Commission quickly filed suit,
challenging the new Department of Justice conclusion that the Wire Act
applies more broadly than to sports gambling alone.111 The new
interpretation sparked concerns from lotteries who offered online sales, as
well as gaming companies who offered intrastate betting, and relied on
the UIGEA’s determination regarding interstate intermediate routing to
offer online gaming, as such activities may implicate the new scope of the
Wire Act.112 Joining the lawsuit was NeoPollard Interactive, a lottery
provider that hired the same legal team that had prevailed in May 2018 at
the Supreme Court in the Murphy case.113

107. Id. at 16.
108. Id. at 17–18.
109. Id. at 18.
110. See DAG Wire Act Letter, supra note 20.
111. See N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Barr, 336 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.N.H. 2019); Ramsey, supra note 21.
112. Ramsey, supra note 21; Christine Swanick, DOJ Opinion Leaves Industry Hanging: If UIGEA
Exclusions Don’t Modify the Wire Act What Does that Mean for Intrastate Gambling
Transactions?, L. LEVEL (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.lawofthelevel.com/2019/01/articles/gambling
/uigea-exclusions-dont-modify-wire-act/ [https://perma.cc/D84Z-EEQE].
113. C. Ryan Barber, Gibson Dunn Team Sues Justice Department Over Reversal on Online
Gaming, LAW.COM (Feb. 16, 2019, 11:21 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/02/16/gi
bson-dunn-team-sues-justice-department-over-reversal-on-online-gambling
[https://perma.cc/5MBYKRRD];
Michael
Casey,
Judge
Gives
Justice
Department
a
Deadline
in
N.H. Lottery Case, CONCORD MONITOR (Apr. 12, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.concordmonitor.com/Ju
dge-gives-Justice-Department-a-deadline-in-lottery-case-24816229 [https://perma.cc/Y79E-CX6H]. In
perhaps a soothsaying moment, Judge Barbadoro noted that regardless of the outcome of the district court
case, the scope of the Wire Act appeared destined for the Supreme Court. See John Brennan, New
Hampshire Judge: The Wire Act Covers Only Sports Betting, US BETS (June 4, 2019),
https://www.usbets.com/new-hampshire-wire-act-sports-betting-ruling [https://perma.cc/K46K-QV8Z].
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On June 3, 2019, Judge Barbadoro ruled that section 1084(a) of the
Wire Act “applies only to transmissions related to bets or wagers on a
sporting event or contest. The 2018 [Office of Legal Counsel] Opinion is
set aside.”114 The first challenge the plaintiffs faced was establishing that
they had standing, as there had not been any actual enforcement actions
taken against non-sports gambling operators under the new opinion, let
alone the plaintiffs. Judge Barbadoro found that the threat faced by the
plaintiffs was concrete and particularized enough that they had
standing.115 Judge Barbadoro further held that the 2018 memorandum was
sufficiently final to merit judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act and that the 2018 memorandum read ambiguity into the
Wire Act that was not present in order to justify the most
recent interpretation.116
The decision from the New Hampshire District Court appeared to be
conclusive, but Judge Barbadoro was very careful to note that the decision
was limited to the plaintiffs and was not a sweeping nationwide
injunction.117 The decision has left the door open, not only for an appeal
by the Department of Justice, but also for other states to challenge the
New Hampshire District Court’s decision in other federal district courts.
The decision, which put the plaintiffs under the auspices of the 2011
memorandum, remains a very limited ruling in terms of its practical
implications. One of the questions that remains is: what exactly was the
Wire Act intended to cover? In Part II, this Article examines the
legislative history of the Wire Act.
II.

THE WIRE ACT’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Wire Act’s history has been the subject of much debate in recent
years.118 But, prior to 2011, the Wire Act existed for almost fifty years
with little controversy. The statute was used largely to target interstate

114. Barr, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 160.
115. Id. at 142–44 (“After operating for years in reliance on OLC guidance that their conduct was not
subject to the Wire Act, the plaintiffs have had to confront a sudden about-face by the Department of Justice.
Even worse, they face a directive from the Deputy Attorney General to his prosecutors that they should
begin enforcing the OLC’s new interpretation of the Act after the expiration of a specified grace period.
Given these unusual circumstances, the plaintiffs have met their burden to establish their standing to sue.”).
116. Id. at 145–52.
117. Id. at 157–59. Judge Barbadaro justified the limited scope of the injunction by stating
“[d]eclaratory judgments do not bind non-parties. The Act allows me to ‘declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.’ It thus limits me to declaring the rights and legal
relations of the plaintiffs seeking the declaration.” Id. at 157 (internal citations omitted).
118. See e.g., James Trusty & Andrew Silver, DOJ High-Wire Act, IFRAH L. (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.ifrahlaw.com/ifrah-on-igaming/doj-high-wire-act/ [https://perma.cc/XYZ9-8S44].
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bookmaking operations with little fanfare for much of that period.119 Two
events brought the Wire Act’s scope into question: first, the arrival of the
internet; and second, the wide-spread expansion of state-sponsored
gambling—two things that the authors of the Wire Act likely never even
contemplated.
The Wire Act originated out of the Kefauver Committee, led by
Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver.120 The Kefauver Committee spent the
early part of the 1950s travelling the United States and holding hearings
in fourteen cities over two years to determine the scope of organized
crime’s grasp.121 The Kefauver Committee returned a series of
recommendations for new legislation, none of which were immediately
adopted.122 It was not until 1961 that Congress would act on one of
Kefauver’s recommendations by passing the Wire Act.123 The Kefauver
Committee prompted more than a decade of hearings aimed at targeting
organized crime’s money-making businesses.124
The period between the 1940s and the 1960s in America saw a shift in
community perceptions of crime.125 Chief among this societal change was
the perception of gambling, as it transitioned from being viewed as a local
matter to a national matter.126 During this period, there were early attempts
by law enforcement agencies to establish estimates of the size of the
illegal gambling market.127 Government officials noted that the illegal
gambling market was run by two syndicates: one controlling the slot
machine and related activities market; and the other controlling the
race wire.128
The race wire, or “racing wire,” was a high-speed service that
disseminated information on gambling contests to “racing rooms” and
individual bookmakers across the country.129 The speed of the wire
119. See, e.g., John Holden, What We Can Learn from Ted Olson’s History With The Wire Act,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 19, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32826/holden-wire-act-tedolson/[https://perma.cc/U8XK-LCC7] (discussing the application of the statute against offshore
bookmakers targeting U.S.-based consumers).
120. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 71.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 72–73.
123. Id. at 78–79, 105.
124. See John Holden, Legislative Sausage Making: How We Got The Wire Act, Part Two, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (Sept. 11, 2018, 12:17 PM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/22329/making-thewire-act-sports-betting-part-two [https://perma.cc/A8A5-JQLA].
125. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 45.
126. Id. at 45.
127. Id. at 48.
128. Id.
129. See Note, Racing Wire Service, 5 STAN. L. REV. 493, 493–95 (1953).
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service was the factor that enabled subscribing bookmakers to be
profitable.130 A bookmaker who did not subscribe to the wire service
might lose out to a customer who had access to live data regarding race
winners.131 Missouri Attorney General J.E. Taylor said that the racing
wire was a relatively unknown service outside of those familiar with
gambling.132 Despite the relative obscurity of the racing wire, several
states began to take steps to regulate race wires during the 1940s, and
Congress held hearings over eleven days in April and May of 1950.133 On
April 4, 1950, Senator Johnson of Colorado told his Senate colleagues,
“[g]ambling information ought to be restricted but there is a border line
between gambling information and legitimate news.”134 The concern with
the overlap between gambling information and reporting information was
something that would permeate the congressional hearings that would
precede the passage of the Wire Act.
A.

Transmission of Wagering Information–1950

The initial 1950 hearing on the Transmission of Wagering Information
revealed several key themes. First, there were concerns regarding
boundaries of state and federal jurisdiction, and to what extent gambling
was a local issue versus a national issue. The second theme that emerged
centered on the emphasis on horse racing that Congress sought to
examine, but it appeared that betting on team sports was a much greater
market. Third, providers of wire services expressed concern that the
proposed bill, as written, might require the services to monitor the actions
of their customers, even when the providers were merely making
information available.
The first Senate hearing regarding criminalizing the transmission of
wagering information heard testimony, or received correspondence, from
more than sixty witnesses.135 Those who testified can be categorized into
four groups: state and local officials, federal officials, media and wire
service operators, and bookmakers.136 The testimony at the hearing
revealed that the wire services were of far greater importance to
130. Id. at 495.
131. Id.
132. See J.E. Taylor, The Transmission of Racing Information by Wire in Missouri, 17 MO. L. REV.
16, 16 (1952).
133. See Transmission of Gambling Information: Hearing on S. 3358 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong. (1950); Note, Racing Wire Service, supra note 129, at 498.
134. 96 CONG. REC. 4639 (1950) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
135. Transmission of Gambling Information, supra note 133, at III–IV.
136. Id.
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bookmakers than horse racing alone. The New York Times makes
reference to the testimony of Wayne Coy, chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), noting that Mr. Coy was concerned
about the burden of having enforcement placed on the FCC as opposed to
a federal law enforcement agency.137 The article also noted that Senator
Capehart remained unconvinced that local officials required federal
assistance to curb gambling.138 Perhaps in the interest of presenting both
sides of the argument, the article quoted alleged underworld figure Frank
Costello, who denied involvement with bookmaking but noted that he
considered bookmakers “no more detrimental to society than a stock
broker, and that liquor was probably more harmful to more people
than gambling.”139
The first hearings that took place regarding the transmission of
gambling information began on April 17, 1950, before the Senate
Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.140
The committee heard testimony from more than sixty witnesses, received
written statements from eight organizations, and received letters from half
of the country’s state attorneys general.141 The impetus for the
congressional hearing was the Attorney General’s conference, which took
place in February of 1950.142 The conference culminated in a resolution
stating: “[b]e it resolved, That this conference go on record as favoring
Federal legislation making Interstate use of telephone, telegraph, or radio
facilities for dissemination of horse race results for illegal gambling
purposes a Federal crime.”143 Following the resolution, the conference
attendees made clear that their recommendation excluded the common
dissemination of sports information through press associations
and newspapers.144
The state attorneys general present at the 1950 conference further noted
that “organized gambling” on baseball, football, and basketball games
made prominent use of interstate communication facilities for carrying on
its transactions.145 U.S. Attorney General J. Howard McGrath opened the
137. Harold B. Hinton, Coy Urges Ban on Transmission of Racing Data, Even for Papers, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1950, at 1.
138. Id.
139. Harold B. Hinton, No Laws Can Halt Gambling, Costello Tells Senate Body: Says He is Not
Qualified to Testify on Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1950, at 1.
140. See generally Transmission of Gambling Information, supra note 133.
141. See id. at III, IV.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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hearing before the subcommittee by stating that gambling “cannot operate
on its present gigantic scale without corrupting what it touches.”146 In
emphasizing the importance of having a clear federal policy for restricting
the transmission of wagering information, McGrath further acknowledged
that the regulation of gambling had traditionally been left to the state.147
The attorney general for Nevada, Alan H. Bible, observed that
gambling enterprises are primarily local in nature, and differences in state
law may obscure the ability to regulate gambling on a national level.148 As
a result, Bible advocated that federal gambling law should serve an
ancillary role to assist states in enforcing their own laws.149 The Nevada
attorney general further argued that any federal regulation prohibiting
transmission of wagering information in interstate commerce should
exempt states that permit the practice.150
John P. McGrath, spokesman for the National Institute of Municipal
Law Offices (NIMLO), cited the findings of a California public utilities
commission hearing that determined that the citizens of the state do not
have an inherent right to utility services, including the telephone, and that
these services therefore may be withheld on the basis that they are being
used in conjunction with illegal activity.151 A discussion between Mayor
Newton of Denver and Senator Capehart revealed the challenge in
negotiating the competing interests of state and local governments and the
federal government.152 Senator Capehart proposed a hypothetical ban on
parimutuel wagering in the states as a means to curb illegal wagering and
inquired if Newton would be in favor of a ban, and Mayor Newton
responded that he would not support such a ban.153 Instead, Newton was
determined that the federal government should be primarily concerned
with drafting and passing legislation that would break up interstate
organized crime syndicates.154
The testimony of Herzel Plaine of the Solicitor General’s Office within
the Department of Justice estimated that there may have been as many as
150,000 bookmakers operating in the country during World War II.155

146. Id. at 11 (testimony of J. Howard McGrath).
147. Id. at 12.
148. Id. at 15 (testimony of Alan H. Bible).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 19 (testimony of John P. McGrath).
152. Id. at 69–70.
153. Id. at 70.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 77 (testimony of Herzel Plaine).
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When asked whether he believed that there was an organized nationwide
syndicate of 150,000 bookmakers, Assistant Attorney General James M.
McInerney said that there is “no evidence which indicates that there is
such an organized criminal syndicate.”156 McInerney further noted that, in
his estimation, federal crime appeared to be decreasing and there was little
support for the contention that there was a nationwide increase in
organized criminal activity.157 McInerney also elucidated that state and
local governments have failed to eradicate bookmakers for two principal
reasons: first, state police forces lack the manpower, and second,
bookmaking has a reputation as a victimless crime.158
Arizona Senator McFarland, in questioning Assistant Attorney General
McInerney, inquired as to whether Congress should also prohibit
dissemination of gambling information via the mail.159 McInerney
responded that banning dissemination of gambling materials through the
mail would be a further hindrance to bookmakers, but it may be more
prudent to simply ban the dissemination of gambling materials in
interstate commerce.160 McInerney further detailed that the race wire
operators collect their information for dissemination by placing agents at
racetracks who then transmit the real-time information back to the wire
service for dissemination, either with authorization of the tracks or in
secret without authorization.161
Mayor Thomas D’Alesandro of Baltimore, when asked whether horse
racing should be banned because it provides an environment that promotes
gambling, responded that it should not because the prospect of presenting
a similar argument for sports such as baseball or basketball would not
garner support.162 Mayor D’Alesandro further noted to Wyoming Senator
Lester Hunt that the proposed bill would likely not encapsulate betting on
baseball or other sports; instead, it would only apply to horse racing.163
While supporting the proposed legislation, Mayor D’Alesandro noted that
he had not seen evidence of a nationwide crime syndicate operating within
the city of Baltimore.164

156. Id. at 77–78 (testimony of James M. McInerney).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 81.
159. Id. at 87.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 88.
162. Id. at 113 (testimony of Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr.).
163. Id. at 115.
164. Id. at 116–17.
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Nathanial Goldstick, counsel for the city of Detroit, testified that the
city had managed to eliminate traditional cigar store front bookmakers,
but that these had been replaced by “vest-pocket handbook operators,”
who are essentially a mobile form of bookmakers.165 Goldstick testified
that it was his belief that a federal law criminalizing the transmission of
wagering information could eliminate the business model used by
bookmakers.166 In a discussion between Goldstick and Senator Capehart
of Indiana, a further challenge to implementation of the proposed bill was
identified when it was noted that the federal government would be
unlikely to provide investigative services to local or state
law enforcement.167
The 1950 hearing that surrounded the first iteration of legislation that
would eventually become the 1961 Wire Act was focused on the theme of
separation of powers between state and federal governments. While state
and municipal authorities welcomed federal assistance, they also stressed
that these bookmakers, in their estimation, were primarily local
operations. The inquiry as to whether there was a national gambling
syndicate was countered by representatives of various federal and state
agencies and governments that appeared to have little information that
would support such a finding, in stark contravention to the impetus for
convening the initial hearing.168
The focus of the 1950 discussion was on the transmission of horse
racing information, and there was a consistent attempt by members of the
Senate to inquire as to the scope of wagering on professional sports. For
instance, Western Union provided a ticker service that furnished inning
by inning scores, which facilitated information to bookmakers to operate
with up to the minute information.169 While the availability of play-byplay baseball information was noted to be important for bookmakers,
Thomas McElroy, assistant attorney general of Texas, stated that he did
not believe it was necessary to include play-by-play baseball information
within the scope of the statute.170
Wayne Coy of the FCC noted that at the time basketball and football
games had what were perceived to be centrally created odds that were
produced and transmitted in advance.171 However, according to his
165. Id. at 155 (testimony of Nathanial Goldstick).
166. Id. at 155–56.
167. Id. at 180–81.
168. See, e.g., id. at 115–16 (testimony of Mayor D’Alesandro) (discussing the lack of support he
had seen for a finding of nationwide crime syndicates operating within Baltimore).
169. Id. at 93 (testimony of James M. McInerney).
170. Id. at 321 (testimony of Thomas McElroy).
171. Id. at 327 (testimony of Wayne Coy).
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testimony, a great deal of betting on baseball took place during the game,
and odds could fluctuate on a play-by-play basis.172 Coy advocated for the
interest of completeness, but noted the difficulties of crafting a bill to
cover all “information assisting in the placing of bets,” because it could
effectively cover “all information concerning baseball games.”173
Russell Brophy, a Los Angeles-based bookmaker, articulated that
Congress faced a challenge in attempting to regulate what activities the
proposed ban would apply to.174 A bookmaker will take a bet on “anything
that the public would be interested in,” according to Brophy’s
testimony.175 Brophy further informed the Senate subcommittee that
stopping the racing wire would not stop people from gambling.176 Brophy
expressed that the business of bookmaking on baseball far surpasses the
off-track-betting business.177 The frequency of baseball games provides
an attractive feature for both bookmakers and bettors.178
Walter Semingsen of Western Union stated that the company’s
commercial news department provided sports scores through various
ticker services, noting that the company had a history of assisting law
enforcement, and that the company did not provide gambling information,
such as live odds.179 As a result of the perceived burden that would be
presented by requiring Western Union to know what business its
customers were in before providing its service, it was proposed that
common carriers should be exempt for the scope of the statute.180
Semingsen further attempted to distance Western Union’s service from
other race wires by noting that all the baseball information was gathered
by Western Union, operating under contract with the various baseball
leagues.181 Samuel Perlman noted that criminalizing the publication of
specific aspects of sporting events, such as live scores or horse racing
results, would simply create a monopoly for bookmakers who are already
operating illegally, as they would find a means to gather
the information.182

172. Id. at 327–28.
173. Id. at 328.
174. Id. at 498 (testimony of Russell Brophy).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 499.
177. Id. at 506.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 598–99 (testimony of Walter Semingsen).
180. Id. at 604.
181. Id. at 628.
182. Id. at 709 (testimony of J. Samuel Perlman).
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Anticrime Legislation–1951

The second Senate hearing to take place with regards to legislation that
would become the Wire Act took place over September 19, 20, and 21,
1951.183 The Anticrime Legislation hearings of 1951 contained four
separate, but related, gambling bills.184 Herzel E. Plaine, special assistant
to the attorney general, testified that the new proposed bill, Senate Bill
1563, presented an improvement over the bill debated in 1950, because it
now contained a licensing provision.185 By incorporating a licensing
provision that would be administered by the FCC, the federal government
could delineate wire services used for legitimate activities from wire
services utilized primarily for bookmaking because the bookmaking wire
services would be unable to meet the burden of licensure.186 Plaine further
explained that it was the position of his office that requiring licenses for
wire services would not run afoul of the First Amendment protections
granted to speech or the press, and as an added security, newspapers were
exempted from the scope of the legislation.187
Proposed Senate Bill 1564, the one of the four that was a direct
predecessor to the Wire Act, also contained a provision that would create
a separate offense for any individual who “surreptitiously” obtained and
transmitted gambling information regarding horse or dog racing or
sporting events without the permission of the venue operator.188 Plaine
made efforts to articulate that the Department of Justice was not
attempting to limit the dissemination of the information itself, but instead
the agency was trying to limit individuals who used the information for
gambling purposes.189 Assistant Attorney General Raymond Whearty
testified that it would be beneficial if the proposed laws contained broader
language, arguing that the term “gambling enterprise” should be included
so that it would be clear that organized entities were the target.190 While
Whearty testified that the Department of Justice did not have an objection
to the bill, he noted that questions remained within the Department

183. See Anticrime Legislation: Hearing on S. 1563, S. 1564, S. 1624 & S. 2116 Before the S.
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82nd Cong. (1951).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 8 (testimony of Herzel E. Plaine).
186. Id. at 9.
187. Id. at 9.
188. Id. at 12.
189. Id. at 17.
190. Id. at 22 (testimony of Raymond P. Whearty).

08 Holden.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/30/20 11:47 PM

THROUGH THE WIRE ACT

701

whether there was a conflict of federal regulation infringing on an area of
state concern.191
Wayne Coy, chairman of the FCC, testified that the prohibitions
contained within the proposed bills were within the domain of federal
jurisdiction and did not intrude on state sovereignty.192 In his testimony,
Coy identified further problems in the proposed bill, including the lack of
definition exempting “newspapers of general circulation,” a term Coy
believed would be exploited by the very bookmakers engaged in the
behavior the bill sought to stamp out.193
Spencer J. Drayton, executive secretary for the Thoroughbred Racing
Associations of the United States, testified that the organization’s Code of
Standards prohibited wire-services from disseminating directly or
indirectly to illegal bookmakers.194 Drayton supported the position that
bookmaking was a local issue, but argued that the “bookmakers’ wire
service” was a monopolistic enterprise that had a “corrupting influence in
all sports today.”195 While Drayton noted his opinion that federal
intervention might be necessary in order to curb some aspects of the
gambling wire service, he questioned whether the language might extend
too far and ban activities that were legal and regulated in a variety
of states.196
Walter Semingsen, Assistant Vice President of Western Union,
testified before the Senate Committee that the “furnishing or receiving of
racing news” is no more similar to gambling than the publication of racing
news in daily newspapers or on television.197 Semingsen testified that it
was Western Union’s position that the proposed bills put an undue burden
on common carriers to investigate what activities their customers intended
to utilize their services for.198 John Hanselman of AT&T testified that
there were more than half a billion messages generated each year in
interstate commerce, and it would not be reasonable to subject the carriers
to liability, as proposed, for failing to know the content of each particular
message.199

191. Id. at 24.
192. Id. at 41 (testimony of Wayne Coy).
193. Id. at 48.
194. Id. at 69 (statement of Spencer J. Drayton).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 70.
197. Id. at 72 (statement of Walter Semingsen).
198. Id. at 83.
199. Id. at 98 (testimony of John J. Hanselman).
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On the final day of the hearings in 1951, Senator Herbert R. O’Conor
of Maryland testified that the proposed bills were intended to strike at
“organized criminals and hoodlums.”200 Senator O’Conor further argued
that despite the reluctance of the FCC to take on oversight of the proposed
bills, it was likely best suited to monitor for prohibited activities.201
Senator O’Conor’s support for the bill, however, was challenged by
Benedict P. Cottone, FCC general counsel, who argued that the bill posed
a burden on the FCC in having to determine the fitness of applicants
for licensure.202
The 1951 hearings were followed by a series of Senate reports.203 The
first report, filed by Senator Johnson of Colorado, expressed the
committee’s opinion that the “most effective and basic means of halting
illegal off-track betting on racing is in the hands of local enforcement
officials.”204 The recommendations were for licensure, and a ban on the
transmission of racing information until after the conclusion of the
event.205 The report clearly articulated that the bill’s purpose was to “aid
the respective States in coping with off-track horse- and dog-race betting
carried on illegally by bookmakers by denying or hampering the use of
interstate communications facilities to furnish information and news
essential to such operations.”206 The report noted that while initially
proposed to “prohibit the transmission of all sporting information,” this
would likely run into constitutional concerns.207 The Johnson Senate
report clearly articulated that the definition of “gambling information”
was “limited to information concerning horse racing and dog racing.”208
While the gambling information provisions of the draft bill applied
specifically to horse and dog racing, disseminators of all sporting
information were required to file a statement that they were using the
communication facilities for such a purpose though such transmissions
were not prohibited nor made a federal crime.209
A subsequent report, filed by Senator O’Conor, would have expanded
the scope of the legislation so as to include within the purpose not only

200. Id. at 106 (statement of Herbert R. O’Conor).
201. Id. at 107.
202. Id. at 154 (testimony of Benedict P. Cottone).
203. See S. REP. NO. 82-925 (1951); S. REP. NO. 82-927 (1951).
204. S. REP. NO. 82-925, at 2 (1951).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 7.
207. Id. at 26.
208. Id. at 32.
209. Id. at 36.
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horse and dog racing, but also other sporting events.210 O’Conor’s report
noted that while the Department of Justice opposed the draft bill, the
Senate Crime Investigating Committee encouraged the consideration of
the bill as a means of slowing the access of bookmakers to information.211
The O’Conor report clearly advocated for a broader scope in the proposed
law than was proposed by the Johnson report, though the bill would not
pass, prompting another effort in 1954.212 But before the third hearing on
the subject, a bill was introduced in 1953 that received the analysis of the
Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.213
The Senate report noted that the new bill was intended to assist the
states “in coping with off-track horse- and dog-race betting carried on
illegally by bookmakers by denying or hampering the use of interstate
communications facilities . . . .”214 The 1953 report, like the 1951 Johnson
report, banned the transmission of gambling information on horse and dog
racing, but did not include other sports within that prohibition, instead
requiring lessees or wire circuits to maintain a list of purchasers of sports
information.215 But like the 1951 legislation, the 1953 legislation did not
gain sufficient support to pass.216
C.

Antigambling Legislation–1954

The third Senate hearing heard testimony from very few witnesses;
however, for the first time, the subcommittee received statements and
heard testimony from industry groups.217 While industry groups were
present at the 1954 hearing, the proposed bill was not supported by the
agency tasked with executing its enforcement.218 The Senate report that
followed the hearing made clear that the purpose of the latest bill was to
“prohibit the recurrence of the wire service as a tool of the bookmaking
racket which made it possible to organize bookmakers throughout the
country through the means of selling them a fast service provided by a
network of communication facilities.”219 The 1954 bill, Senate Bill 3542,
210. S. REP. NO. 82-927, at 1.
211. Id. at 2.
212. Antigambling Legislation: Hearing on S. 3190 & S. 3542 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 83rd Cong. (1954).
213. See S. REP. NO. 83-500 (1953).
214. Id. at 5.
215. Id. at 6.
216. Antigambling Legislation, supra note 212.
217. Id. at III.
218. Id. at 8 (testimony of Rosel Hyde).
219. S. REP. NO. 83-1652, at 1 (1954).

08 Holden.docx (Do Not Delete)

704

5/30/20 11:47 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:677

sought to make clear that the legislation was only to apply to horse and
dog racing, striking the word “sporting” from the draft.220 The Department
of Justice concluded that sports like “baseball, boxing, and other sporting
events . . . cannot be organized and controlled” in the same manner as
animal racing, and were thus removed.221 While the sporting event
language was struck from the prohibition, it remained an obligation for
lessors disseminating sports event information to file statements detailing
their activity with their common carriers.222
The third Senate hearing on limiting the transmission of gambling
information across wired communication facilities took place on June 7
and 8, 1954.223 The hearing generated a transcript of forty-seven pages,
the shortest transcript of any hearing regarding legislation that would
become the Wire Act.224 Warren Olney III, assistant attorney general,
testified that Senate Bill 3542 was essentially the same bill that the Justice
Department had supported since 1950.225 Olney testified that the proposed
bill was necessary because bookmaking monopolies were operating
beyond the reach of state-level authorities by positioning themselves
outside of the jurisdiction and transmitting wagering information into
jurisdictions creating an interstate issue.226
Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, testified that he viewed preventing
the transmission of wagering information as a law enforcement problem
and not as an obligation of an administrative agency.227 Chairman Hyde
noted that the proposed bill appeared to limit its own “effectiveness and
efficiency” by banning communication facilities from transmitting
gambling information in interstate or foreign commerce, but exempting
gambling transmission for printed news or television and/or radio
purposes.228 Hyde argued that it was his belief that Congress should pass
a law that was to be enforced by local law enforcement agencies and not
the FCC or common carriers.229 Rufus King, of the American Bar
Association (ABA), testified that the proposed wagering information ban
was endorsed by the ABA membership.230 In contrast, Walter Gallagher,
220. Id. at 1.
221. Id. at 2.
222. Id. at 5.
223. See Antigambling Legislation, supra note 212.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 3 (testimony of Warren Olney III).
226. Id. at 4.
227. Id. at 8 (testimony of Rosel Hyde).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 10.
230. Id. at 14, 16 (testimony of Rufus King) (King testified that while the ABA supported the bill the

08 Holden.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/30/20 11:47 PM

THROUGH THE WIRE ACT

705

counsel for various sporting news agencies, including the Illinois Sport
News and the Daily Sport News, testified that it was his belief that the
proposed bills went too far in attempts to prohibit dissemination of
wagering information.231 Gallagher suggested that it was problematic that
wagering information, the possession of which was not prohibited at the
state level, was proposed to be prohibited at the federal level.232
D.

Report of Proceedings–1956

The fourth Senate hearing on a bill to limit the transmission of
wagering information took place on July 2, 1956, before the
Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce.233 Similar to the hearing in 1954, the 1956
hearings contained debate on the legislative predecessor to the Wire Act,
in addition to a bill that sought to amend slot machine regulations.234 The
first person to testify regarding Senate Bill 950 was David Luce, first
assistant, Criminal Division Department of Justice, who articulated that
the bill had a dual purpose: first, to assist the states in the enforcement of
their own laws; and second, to aid in the suppression of organized crime
activities.235 Luce testified that the definition of gambling information was
restricted to information relating to horse and dog racing.236 In response
to a question from Senator Potter about whether this statute would have
any impact on wire services carrying information about football or
baseball games, Luce responded that the proposed bill only applied to
horse and dog racing.237 Luce noted that the exclusion of other sports from
the bill was prefaced on the belief that syndicated bookmaking had not
entered the field of sports.238
Warren Baker, of the FCC, noted that the agency no longer had
objections to the proposed bill.239 Rufus King, appearing again for the
ABA, testified that the new bill omitted the provision that restricted

organization actually supported amending the language to encapsulate additional games of chance).
231. Id. at 28–29 (testimony of Walter Gallagher).
232. Id. at 28.
233. See Report of Proceedings: Hearing on S. 3018 & S. 950 Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong. (1956).
234. Id. at 2.
235. Id. at 3 (testimony of David Luce).
236. Id. at 3.
237. Id. at 5.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 24 (testimony of Warren Baker).
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“instantaneous” transmission of gambling information.240 King seemed to
rebut the testimony of Luce, arguing that organized crime had begun to
shift its focus away from horse and dog racing into baseball, football, and
college sports.241 King further testified that it was his belief that organized
crime was involved in the fixing of college basketball games.242 King
concluded by stating that while the ABA supported Senate Bill 950,
earlier versions of the bill were more comprehensive and stronger, in
his opinion.243
The fourth Senate hearing on a bill that predated the Wire Act
suggested, once again, a very narrow interpretation of the scope of the
proposed legislation.244 The New York Times reported that Rufus King’s
comments about gambling and collegiate sports prompted Senator Potter
to comment that Congress may wish to investigate the issue.245 The Times
further noted that Potter was under the impression that the Justice
Department appeared out of touch with the evolution of the gambling
world.246 It would be nearly five years before the final two hearings on
legislation regarding the transmission of wagering information, and nearly
a decade after Senator Kefauver made his initial recommendations.
E.

Legislation Relating to Organized Crime–1961

The House hearing in 1961 represented a change from previous
hearings, as it saw discussions of various versions of bills that would
accomplish similar objectives. Testimony revealed that the draft bills
presented many of the same concerns as previous iterations, including:
(1) being too broad or overly vague; (2) having questionable
constitutional foundations; and (3) prompting questions about who would
bear the burden of enforcement.247 The New York Times reported on the
240. Id. at 39 (testimony of Rufus King).
241. Id. at 43.
242. Id. at 44. Indeed, one of the largest game-fixing scandals in the history of the United States took
place involving primarily New York based teams in the 1950s accepting bribes from organized crime figures
to manipulate the outcomes of collegiate basketball games. See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, The
Sports Bribery Act: A Law and Economics Approach, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 453, 456 n.13 (2015).
243. Report of Proceeding: Hearing on s. 3018 & s. 950 Before the Subcomm. on Communications
of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong. 49 (1956).
244. See, e.g., id. at 39 (1956) (testimony of Rufus King, noting previous bills were more comprehensive).
245. Sports Inquiry Urged: Potter Asks Study of Gambling Influence on Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 1956, at 22.
246. Id.
247. See e.g., Legislation Relating to Organized Crime Hearings on H.R. 468, H.R. 1246, H.R.
3021, H.R. 3022, H.R. 3023, H.R. 3246, H.R. 5230, H.R. 6571, H.R. 6572, H.R. 6909, H.R. 7039
Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee of the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 379 (1961) (testimony of
Arthur H. Christy, Chairman, Comm. on Criminal Courts, Law & Procedure of the Ass’n of the Bar
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House hearing, noting that Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy estimated
that organized gambling had a gross value of $7 billion.248
In 1961, Congress held several hearings on omnibus bills aimed at
halting the perceived growth of organized crime. One of the hearings
occurred over seven days in May 1961 and heard testimony on a bill
directly related to the version of the Wire Act that was signed into law.249
Representative William McCulloch of Ohio introduced the hearings on
the eleven bills to be debated by asking for nonpartisan support for the
bills, noting that the majority of the bills were nearly identical to those
from the previous Eisenhower administration.250 The Wire Act legislation
was introduced as two separate bills, House Bill 3022251 and House
Bill 7039.252
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy testified first, citing anecdotes of
corruption at the local level and the need for the federal government to
step in and assist “honest citizens.”253 Kennedy further compared the
corner bookmaker to the part of an iceberg that floats above the surface of
the water, noting that the visible bookmaker represented only a small
portion of the illegal gambling network.254 Kennedy further stressed the
need for federal involvement by arguing that local officials were unable
to reach the leaders of these gambling enterprises because they live far
from the action.255 Kennedy further noted that the intention of the
legislation was to limit the application to gambling as a business, not as a
social activity.256
Max D. Paglin testified on behalf of the FCC before the House of
Representatives and reiterated the FCC’s long standing position that it did
not desire to be in a situation in which it was tasked with law enforcement
obligations.257 Paglin further informed the House committee that the
proposed definition of “wire facility” might not encapsulate modern

of N.Y.C., noting the bill may criminalize a large number of potentially unintended activities).
248. Congress Urged to Act on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1961, at 18.
249. See Legislation Relating to Organized Crime Hearings on H.R. 468, H.R. 1246, H.R. 3021,
H.R. 3022, H.R. 3023, H.R. 3246, H.R. 5230, H.R. 6571, H.R. 6572, H.R. 6909, H.R. 7039 Before
Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee of the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961).
250. Id. at 5 (statement of Rep. William McCulloch).
251. Id. at 6.
252. Id. at 8.
253. Id. at 19 (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the U.S.).
254. Id. at 20.
255. Id. at 21.
256. Id. at 26.
257. Id. at 126 (testimony of Max D. Paglin, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n).
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means of radio transmission.258 The National Association of Defense
Lawyers in Criminal Cases, represented by Richard A. Green, filed a
prepared statement arguing that the proposed House Bill 3022 “appear[s]
to have little or no value in prosecuting gambling crimes.”259 The United
States Independent Telephone Association (USITA), represented by
Bradford Ross, testified that the association remained concerned that
proposed House Bill 3022 would require the members to act as police to
enforce the statute or face criminal and civil penalties themselves.260
Dan F. Hazen, Assistant Vice President of Western Union, testified that
he was concerned that the language used may require his employees to
engage in investigative work.261 Hazen argued that the proposed
regulations with penalty provisions seemingly targeted corporations like
his that already made attempts to comply and assist law enforcement when
they were made aware of allegations of illegal activity.262
Concerns regarding the scope of House Bill 3022 were further
highlighted by Arthur H. Christy, a representative of the New York City
Bar Association, who believed that the proposed requirement for filing
affidavits by operators transmitting gambling information was impractical
and would be “difficult to enforce.”263 Christy further argued that
enforcement of the proposed bill seemed impractical and relied on the
employees of common carriers to enforce a federal law.264 The American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argued that the language used was
unnecessarily broad and placed an unconstitutional inhibition on freedom
of expression for a broad class of activities.265 The House hearings would
lead into Senate hearings in June of 1961.266

258. Id. at 132.
259. Id. at 161 (statement of Richard A. Green, Chairman, Comm. on Legislation, Nat’l Ass’n of
Def. Lawyers).
260. Id. at 192 (statement of Bradford Ross, U.S. Indep. Tel. Ass’n).
261. Id. at 295 (testimony of Dan F. Hazen, Assistant Vice President, W. Union Tel. Co.).
262. Id. at 297–99.
263. Id. at 379 (testimony of Arthur H. Christy, Chairman, Comm. on Criminal Courts, Law &
Procedure of the Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C.).
264. Id. at 379.
265. Id. at 383 (statement of the ACLU).
266. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering Hearings on S.
1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
87th Cong. (1961).
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The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime – 1961

The Senate held their hearings in June 1961, over five nonconsecutive
days, to debate a series of bills.267 The hearings would serve as
companions to the hearings in the House of Representatives that occurred
several weeks earlier.268 The Senate bill that would eventually become the
Wire Act was labeled, “S. 1656.”269 Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
opened the hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee by testifying
to the importance of the seven proposed bills.270
Kennedy stated that it was not the intention of the Department of
Justice to usurp local police powers, but it was only the federal
government that could tackle the complex structure of organized crime
due to the multistate basis on which the organized crime groups
operated.271 Kennedy testified that Senate Bill 1656 had been carefully
drafted to protect the freedoms guaranteed to the press.272 The bill
contained exemptions for “legitimate news reporting of sporting events,”
and it was argued that nothing in the bill would alter the present state of
sports reporting.273 Kennedy would further observe: “[i]n fact, wireless
communication was not included in this bill because it is our belief that
the Federal Communications Commission has ample authority to control
the misuse of this means of communication.”274 Kennedy stated that the
bill did not exempt common carriers, but that they should not be burdened
unless there was intentional supplying or maintaining of facilities being
used for gambling purposes.275
Kennedy testified that while the bill “is not interested in the casual
dissemination of information with respect to football, baseball or other
sporting events between acquaintances,” the bill would apply to the
professional gambler, who was a large layoff bettor who attempted to
avoid liability by stating, “I just like to bet. I just make social wagers.”276
Kennedy stressed that while the bill was not intended to apply to
nonprofessional gamblers, it would be poor public policy for the

267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. Id. at 1 (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen.).
271. Id. at 11.
272. Id. at 12.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 12–13.
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Department of Justice to be seen condoning some forms of gambling, but
not others.277
Richard March appeared on behalf of his client, the USITA, and his
law partner, Bradford Ross, to deliver to the committee Ross’s
statement.278 In the statement, Ross argued that Senate Bill 1656 placed
telephone companies in a dilemma of facing regulatory or criminal
prosecution or civil damages by having to act as an enforcement
agency.279 Ross argued that making the telephone company responsible
for determining whether a client was using a service for illegal gambling
business would unfairly subject the companies to law suits from
customers who had their service disconnected. John J. Hanselman,
assistant vice president of AT&T, testified that the language restricting
the bill to “wire communication facility” should be extended so that it
encompassed any “communication facility.”280 Hanselman stated that his
company believed the language of the bill should be modified and that his
company had concerns about the absence of a provision to hold common
carriers harmless.281 In a supplemental statement filed by Bradford Ross,
he noted that the USITA would endorse a version of the Wire Act if the
bill contained protections against civil suits resulting from termination of
services at the direction of law enforcement.282
Dan F. Hazen of the Western Union Telegraph Company testified that
the company had concerns about the proposed bill and the absence of any
requirement on the part of law enforcement to notify the provider of
suspected criminal activity and failure of the company to terminate the
service as the basis for a violation.283 Hazen noted that not only did the
telegraph company not possess subpoena power, the Communications Act
banned the monitoring of “leased facility services” to determine if there
was a violation of law.284
Rufus King of the ABA noted that the proposed bill was quite similar
in scope to the original bill proposed in 1950.285 King noted that he had a
personal concern over whether the bill did enough to protect the act of
casual betting, noting that it was his interpretation that if he were to call

277. Id. at 13.
278. Id. at 34 (statement of Richard S. T. March, Att’y, U.S. Indep. Tel. Ass’n).
279. Id. (statement of Bradford Ross, U.S. Indep. Tel. Ass’n).
280. Id. at 39 (statement of John J. Hanselman, Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.).
281. Id. at 40.
282. Id. at 45 (supplemental statement of Bradford Ross, U.S. Indep. Tel. Ass’n).
283. Id. at 58 (statement of Dan F. Hazen, Assistant Vice President, W. Union Tel. Co.).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 64 (statement of Rufus King, Rice & King, appearing on behalf of the Am. Bar Ass’n).

08 Holden.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/30/20 11:47 PM

THROUGH THE WIRE ACT

711

his brother in Maryland and place a one-dollar bet on a baseball game, he
would be violating the Wire Act.286 King went on to note that it struck the
ABA as odd that while the Wire Act prohibited the transmission of
wagering information, it did not prohibit the transfer of money for
payment of gambling debts.287
In response to the testimony of the telephone and telegraph executives,
Herbert Miller, assistant attorney general, testified that the Department of
Justice opposed any exemption for common carriers.288 Miller noted that
if the common carriers determine that illegal activity was taking place,
they should be in a position to act.289 The Department of Justice’s
opposition to a “hold harmless” provision in the statute would leave
improperly aggrieved customers with no resolution.290 Miller testified that
the bill was intended to cover only sporting events and contests, but
conceded, in response to a question, that wrestling was within the scope
of the statute despite the fact that it was “more of a performance than a
contest.”291 Miller went on to testify that the bill “was aimed at a particular
situation, gambling, a specific type of gambling, and the layoff bettor.”292
The Senate Judiciary hearing on Senate Bill 1656 represented the final
full-scale hearing into the bills that were debated prior to the enactment
of the Wire Act. However, there was an additional hearing, held as an
executive session before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.293 The
committee debated what final tweaks were to be made, including the
incorporation of some of the common carriers requests.294 The final
Senate Judiciary hearing reported that Senate Bill 1656 would be reported
to the whole Senate.295 Following the House and Senate hearings, each
legislative body submitted a report.296
The Senate report noted that there was a modification to the text of the
bill specifying that it was to apply to those in the business of betting or
wagering.297 The legislation was to target bookmakers and layoff men
286. Id. at 65.
287. Id. at 69.
288. Id. at 275 (statement of Herbert Miller, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 277.
291. Id. at 278 (quoting Sen. Estes Kefauver).
292. Id. (testimony of Herbert Miller, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice).
293. See Report of Proceeding: Hearing held before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (July
10, 1961).
294. See id.
295. Id. at 69.
296. S. REP. NO. 87-588 (1961); H.R. REP. NO. 87-967 (1961).
297. S. REP. NO. 87-588, at 2 (1961).
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“who need incoming and outgoing wire communication in order to
operate.”298 The Senate report included a letter from the attorney general
to the vice president that noted that the modern bookmaker relied on wire
communications for not only horse racing results, but also for wagering
on sporting events.299 The House Report of August 17, 1961, echoes much
of the sentiment of the Senate report.300 There is little indication across
the totality of the Wire Act’s legislative history that the application
beyond sports wagering inclusive of dog and horse racing was ever
contemplated. Over eleven years, there was a significant evolution in what
was proposed.
F.

Evolution of the Wire Act

The scope of the Wire Act experienced significant changes after a
decade of evolution. The first version of the bill contained a very specific
focus on horse racing.301 The first major evolutionary moment would
come in 1954, when references to sporting events would be replaced with
specific reference to horse and dog racing.302 This trend would continue
until the Kennedy administration introduced new versions of the Wire
Act.303 The Wire Act’s focus was shifted back to sporting events and
contests, and those who made a business of betting and wagering.304
The first attempt to pass legislation banning the transmission of
wagering information through wire was Senate Bill 3358, in 1950.305
Senate Bill 3358 was composed of six sections.306 Section one stated that
the bill was intended to assist the states in the enforcement of their laws
to suppress organized gambling activities.307 Section two defined five
terms, including “gambling information” as:
[B]ets or wagers or related information assisting in the placing of
bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or transactions or
information facilitating betting or wagering activities on any
298. Id. at 3.
299. Id. at 4–5.
300. H.R. REP. NO. 87-967 (1961).
301. See Transmission of Gambling Information: Hearing on S.3358 Before the Senate Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong. 2 (1950).
302. See S. REP. NO. 83-1652, at 1 (1954).
303. H.R. 3022, 87th Cong. (1961).
304. Id.
305. See Transmission of Gambling Information: Hearing on S.3358 Before the Senate Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong. (1950).
306. Id. at 1–2.
307. Id. at 1.
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sporting event or contest. In connection with horse racing,
gambling information includes among other things entries,
scratches, jockeys, jockey changes, weights, probable
winners . . . betting odds, changes in the betting odds, the post
positions, the results, and the prices paid.308
Section three included the applicability of the statute, noting that it was
unlawful to maintain any facility, other than a radio broadcasting facility,
if that facility received or transmitted gambling information.309
Senate Bill 2116 was the subject of a Senate hearing one year after
Senate Bill 3358.310 Senate Bill 2116 was nearly identical to its
predecessor bill, Senate Bill 3358, containing the exact same penalties for
violations and requiring enforcement by the common carriers.311 The
introduction of bills of identical text is not uncommon, in particular when
bills are introduced toward the conclusion of the congressional term.
In 1954, Senate Bill 3542 was introduced and was the subject of
hearings.312 Senate Bill 3542 represented the first major shift in the
evolution of legislation to curb the transmission of wagering information,
as the legislation that mentioned sporting events had those references
deleted and replaced by horse or dog racing.313 Senate Bill 3542 also
included an addition, in section three, that contained a clarification
statement that the act was not intended to prevent the transmission of news
regarding sporting events to press outlets.314 Additionally, Senate Bill
3542 required a written statement from the lessee as opposed to a sworn
affidavit regarding the intended purpose of the lease of wire services.315
There were no references in the bill to any criminal punishments.316
Senate Bill 950 was introduced in February 1955; however, the bill
would not have a hearing until July of 1956.317 Senate Bill 950 contained
five sections.318 Section two of the proposed statute continued to define
308. Id.
309. Id. at 2.
310. See Anticrime Legislation: Hearing on S. 1563, S. 1564, S. 1624 & S. 2116 Before the Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 82nd Cong. 1–2 (1951).
311. Id. at 1–2.
312. See Antigambling Legislation: Hearing on S. 3190 & S. 3452 Before the S. Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 83rd Cong. 1–3 (1954).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 2.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See Report of Proceedings: Hearing on S. 3018 & S. 950 Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the S. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong. (1956).
318. See S. 950, 84th Cong. (1955).
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gambling information as only containing dog and horse racing events or
contests.319 Senate Bill 950 provided for a more detailed explanation of
the obligations of common carriers upon receipt of a notice from law
enforcement.320 While common carriers had a similar burden placed upon
them, as in the previous bills, absent from Senate Bill 950 was any role
for the FCC to participate in the enforcement of the
proposed legislation.321
In 1961, the House of Representatives debated two bills that were
classified as predecessors to the passed version of the Wire Act. House
Bill 3022 was the first of the two bills to be debated.322 Missing from
House Bill 3022 was the preamble that had consistently stated that the
purpose of the bill was to assist the states in enforcing their own antigambling laws.323 Also changed was the definition of gambling
information. No longer did the legislation reference “animal racing”;
instead, the definition referred solely to “sports event or a contest,” and
with the definition there was also a qualification that a violator must be in
the “business of accepting such wagers.”324 While not inclusive of animal
racing, House Bill 3022 did propose to ban participation in lotteries with
limited exceptions (e.g., lotteries for a charitable purpose).325 House Bill
3022 also required the filing of affidavits as to whether a wire operator
has transmitted wagering information in the past twelve months and
imposed criminal penalties for failure to file or false filing of an
affidavit.326 House Bill 3022 represented a dramatic shift from the
proposed Senate Bill 950. The House bill was much more focused on
federal objectives and on those in the “business of accepting wagers.”327
House Bill 7039, which was debated during the same hearing as House
Bill 3022, was narrowly focused on the individuals who “lease[],
furnish[], or maintain[]” wire communication facilities.328 The bill
proposed that the transmission of bets or wagers or assisting others in
placing of bets or wagers in interstate commerce was punishable by a fine
not to exceed $10,000 or two years in prison.329 House Bill 7039
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. See H.R. 3022, 87th Cong. (1961).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 2.
328. See H.R. 7039, 87th Cong. (1961).
329. Id.
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specifically referenced sporting events or contests, and while it did not
state that it was drafted to assist states in enforcement of their own state
laws, it stated that it did not create immunity under any state law.330
Senate Bill 1656, introduced in April 1961 and debated during Senate
hearings, was the companion to House Bill 7039, and the final Senate
version of the bill that would become the Wire Act.331 The bill evolved
from introduction on April 18, 1961, to the bill that was reported on July
24, 1961, though the principle change was the inclusion of the phrase
“[w]hoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering,” from
the original “[w]hoever leases, furnishes, or maintains any
communication facility with intent.”332 The Senate bill’s change of the
language of the companion House bill to implement the “[w]hoever being
engaged in the business of betting or wagering” in the place of “[w]hoever
leases, furnishes or maintains,” bears little indication that anything other
than added specificity of the intended subject of the statute,333 a fact
supported by the associated hearings.334
The scope of the Wire Act has been a subject of much debate,
particularly since the rise of the internet.335 The congressional hearings
held from 1950 to 1961 reveal that the Wire Act’s scope was often
debated. However, the intent of the law appeared to have been limited to
the transmission of wagering information in relation to sporting events or
animal racing events, with little indication that other gambling activities
were intended to be included in any of the later draft bills. Statements,
such as those made in 2015 by Republican Congressman Jason Chaffetz
that it was Congress’s intent to ban all forms of wagering under the Wire
Act, are unsupported by the hearings that took place over the eleven years
of congressional hearings.336 Similarly, there appears to be little indication
that Congress intended the amendment to Senate Bill 1656 to incorporate
330. Id.
331. See The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings
on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong. (1961).
332. See S. 1656, 87th Cong. (Apr. 18, 1961); S. 1656, 87th Cong. (July 24, 1961).
333. See S. 1656, 87th Cong. (July 24, 1961).
334. See The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings
on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong. (1961).
335. See, e.g., In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001), aff’d sub nom, In
re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that non-sports internet gambling
is not prohibited by the Wire Act).
336. See Chaffetz, Gabbard Work to Restore America’s Wire Act, TULSI GABBARD (Feb. 4, 2015),
https://gabbard.house.gov/news/press-releases/chaffetz-gabbard-work-restore-americas-wire-act
[https://perma.cc/74BP-HJCU].
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the range of activities suggested by the 2018 Office of Legal Counsel
memorandum.337 While the legislative history helps elucidate Congress’s
intent with regards to the scope of the Wire Act, numerous questions
regarding the statute’s application persist. In Part III, this Article examines
some of the prominent questions surrounding the application of the Wire
Act in the modern internet era.
III. WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE WIRE ACT?
The scope of the Wire Act has been something of an open question
since at least the late-1990s, when Congress began to try and regulate
online gambling.338 Whether the Wire Act applies to sports wagering
alone, or whether it applies to a variety of activities, has been the primary
focus of Wire Act discussions and there remain a number of prescient
questions regarding the statute as a result of the Murphy decision, and
expanding state legalization of sports wagering.339 Part III examines some
of the most pressing questions regarding the Wire Act’s scope, including:
(1) whether the Wire Act applies to the internet; (2) who is in the
“business of betting”; (3) whether the Wire Act applies exclusively to
sports betting; (4) what constitutes “information” assisting in placing bets
or wagers; and (5) whether the Wire Act’s safe harbor exempts
transmissions that pass through third-party states that do not allow the
same conduct that is allowed in both the originating and receiving
jurisdiction.
A.

The Wire Act and the Internet

The Wire Act was passed in 1961, decades before the internet became
ubiquitous in American homes.340 While then-Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy341 and the subsequent Senate report342 noted that wireless
communications were not to be included within the statute’s scope, the
337. See ENGEL MEMO, supra note 16.
338. The Internet Gambling Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2–3 (1997).
339. See Nick Rummell, Worries of Online Gambling Crackdown Spur States to Action,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (May 20, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/worries-of-onlinegambling-crackdown-spur-states-to-action [https://perma.cc/KL6X-TW4A].
340. See Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, PEW RES. CTR.
(June 26, 2015), https://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-2015
[https://perma.cc/6NJJ-2ZSW].
341. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings on
S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong. 12 (1961).
342. S. REP. No. 87-588, at 2 (1961).

08 Holden.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/30/20 11:47 PM

THROUGH THE WIRE ACT

717

internet still relies on wired communications facilities in order to exist.343
But the application of the Wire Act to the internet had obviously not been
contemplated in 1961, as the internet remained years away, leaving
contemporary courts to address the question of whether the Wire Act
applies to the internet.344
One of the first cases to apply the Wire Act to internet sports wagering
was United States v. Cohen345 in 2001. Cohen operated a sports betting
operation in Antigua that accepted wagers both via the telephone and via
the internet.346 While Cohen never directly appealed the issue of whether
the Wire Act applied to internet wagering, in addition to the telephone
wagering, the court expressed that the internet communications passed
through “wire facilities,” thus implicating the statute.347 In re Mastercard
adds further support to the position that, as internet wagering passes
through wire communication facilities, the Wire Act is applicable to
internet conduct.348 In United States v. Lyons,349 the defendants argued, on
appeal, that the Wire Act is inapplicable to the internet, as it is not a “wire
communication facility;” however, the First Circuit rejected this argument
noting that the statute has regularly been attached to infringing conduct
over the internet, and that the internet involves a transmission “to and
from customers.”350
While, in early attempts to regulate internet gambling, congressional
testimony may have lacked certainty regarding the application of existing
laws to the internet,351 courts have not struggled to find that the Wire Act
incorporates the internet within its prohibition of the use of a “wire
communication facility.”352 The Wire Act appears to certainly apply to
transactions taking place via the internet, but the statute only applies to
343. For an overview of how the internet functions, see Steven Li, How Does the Internet Work?,
MEDIUM (Aug. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/@User3141592/how-does-the-internet-workedc2e22e7eb8 [https://perma.cc/D5H6-4F3F].
344. C. Jeremy Pope, Losing the Battle but Winning the War: The Federal Government’s Attempts
to Regulate Internet Gaming Through Utilization of the Wire Act and Other Means, 74 MISS. L.J.
903, 907 (2005).
345. 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
346. Id. at 70–71.
347. Id. at 76.
348. In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 479–81 (E.D. La. 2001), aff’d sub nom, In
re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing that, while the Wire Act is limited
to interstate internet sports wagering, such conduct does fall with the statute’s scope).
349. 740 F.3d 702 (1st Cir. 2014).
350. Id. at 716–18.
351. See The Internet Gambling Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
352. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2018).

08 Holden.docx (Do Not Delete)

718

5/30/20 11:47 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:677

those in the “business of betting or wagering,” which is examined in
section B.353
B.

Who is in the Business of Betting or Wagering?

The phrase “business of betting or wagering” appears in a variety of
federal statutes, including the Wire Act and the UIGEA.354 The legislative
hearings in the later years of efforts to pass Wire Act legislation noted the
importance of not targeting casual bettors, but instead targeting
bookmakers, and large layoff bettors.355 Hayes and Conigliaro argued that
the plain language interpretation of the Wire Act supports a narrow
interpretation as to the scope of the phrase “the business of betting or
wagering.”356 A narrow interpretation, as suggested, would incorporate a
bookmaker, as the bookmaker is obviously within the business of
accepting bets or wagers, but may not incorporate a parimutuel operator,
“who has no stake in the event’s outcome and, thus, is not itself betting or
wagering.”357 The lack of definition within the statute, and the narrow
result of the plain meaning may suggest that the phrase has some
ambiguity requiring a more extensive examination of the
legislative history.358
The legislative history of the Wire Act contains repeated observations
that the statute was not intended to target the casual or social wager made
amongst friends.359 The Senate report that discusses the purpose of the
addition of the “business of betting or wagering” language states
as follows:
The second amendment changes the language of the bill, as
introduced (which prohibited the leasing, furnishing, or
maintaining of wire communication facility with intent that it be
used for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets
or wagers), to prohibit the use of wire communication facility by
persons engaged in the business of betting or wagering, in the
353. Id.
354. See Ben J. Hayes & Matthew J. Conigliaro, “The Business of Betting or Wagering”: A
Unifying View of Federal Gaming Law, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 445, 447 (2009).
355. See The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings
on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong. 12–13 (1961).
356. Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 354, at 451–52.
357. Id. at 452.
358. Id.
359. See The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings
on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong. 12–13 (1961); supra section II.E.
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belief that the individual user, engaged in the business of betting
or wagering, is the person at whom the proposed legislation
should be directed; and has further amended the bill to prohibit
the transmission of wire communications which entitle the
recipient to receive money as the result of betting or wagering
which is designed to close another avenue utilized by gamblers
for the conduct of their business.360
The purpose of the amended language was to target those running
gambling businesses and to close loopholes that might allow someone to
escape prosecution. The legislation was referred to as targeting organized
crime and professional gambling operations.361 By 1961, it became
apparent that Congress supported a more limited range of targeted entities,
through a narrow interpretation of those in the business of betting
or wagering.
Although the legislative history of the Wire Act supports a narrow
application of the statute, the case law is perhaps slightly broader.
Nevertheless, there has been no direct challenge to the business of betting
or wagering not involving “bookmakers, professional gamblers, criminal
organizations, or individuals associated with such persons.”362
Importantly, courts have held that the Wire Act does not incorporate the
act of mere betting.363 While there is likely a fact-specific analysis of when
casual betting becomes a gambling business, in one case regarding an
ongoing relationship between a bettor and an acquaintance, where the
acquaintance accepted between fifty and seventy wagers, the Court found
that the activity violated the Wire Act.364 The Wire Act’s application to
those in the business of betting or wagering is likely a fairly narrow scope
of activities with which the government is capable of targeting both by the
law’s plain language and existing jurisprudence.365

360. S. REP. No. 87-588, at 2 (1961).
361. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings on
S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong. 12 (1961).
362. See Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 354, at 460–61.
363. See, e.g., United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 327–28 (D.R.I. 1981), rev’d sub nom,
United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that while some aspects of who was
intended to be covered by the phrase “professional gambler” are uncertain, “[w]hatever meaning the
Congress had in mind, it certainly did not appear to include a mere bettor”).
364. Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 354, at 462 (citing Truchinski v. United States, 393 F.2d 627,
630–31 (8th Cir. 1968)).
365. See id. at 465–66.
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Does the Wire Act only Apply to Sports Betting?

Indeed, the most enduring question in recent memory about the Wire
Act’s scope asks whether the Wire Act incorporates only sports betting or
whether it incorporates a plurality of activities.366 The 1997 internet
gambling hearing featured testimony that elucidated the perception that
the Wire Act was only intended to apply to sports wagering.367 Gambling
expert Anthony Cabot testified:
The key deficits with application of current law to Internet
gambling would be solved by this bill’s expansion of the
definition of a communication facility, by its removing of
ambiguities caused by the words “sporting event or contest,” and
by broadening the definition of a bet or wager.368
The implication of Cabot’s testimony was that the Wire Act would
require an amendment to incorporate activities beyond sports betting.369
There is virtually no testimony in the final two Wire-Act-related hearings
that indicate the scope of the bill to incorporate a range of activities
beyond sports betting.370 In fact, the assistant attorney general testified
that the statute “was aimed at a particular situation, gambling, a specific
type of gambling, and the layoff bettor.”371 The Miller testimony was in
reference to the statute targeting the narrow gambling activity of sports
betting.372 Contrary to the 2018 Office of Legal Counsel’s assertions that
the amendments to the language imposing the “business of betting or
wagering” language was part of a scheme to limit only one portion of the
statute to sports betting or wagering, there is no indication in the Senate
report detailing this change that such was the intent.373

366. See Mark Hichar & Erica Okerberg, DOJ Opinion Increases the Scope of the Wire Act,
Significantly Affecting Gaming Industry Stakeholders, 23 GAMING L. REV. 168 (2019).
367. The Internet Gambling Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
368. Id. at 24 (statement of Anthony Cabot).
369. Id.
370. See Legislation Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on H.R. 468, H.R. 1246, H.R. 3021,
H.R. 3022, H.R. 3023, H.R. 3246, H.R. 5230, H.R. 6571, H.R. 6572, H.R. 6909, H.R. 7039 Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961); The Attorney General’s
Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656,
S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961).
371. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings on
S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong. 278 (1961) (statement of Herbert Miller, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S.).
372. Id.
373. S. REP. No. 87-588 (1961).
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The case law on the whether the Wire Act only applies to sports
wagering is mixed, with In re Mastercard being the most prominent
decision to hold that the statute is limited to wagering on “sporting events
or contests.”374 In addition to the Fifth Circuit, there is dicta from the First
Circuit supporting a conclusion that the Wire Act applies exclusively to
betting and wagering on sporting events or contests.375 Meanwhile, in
other cases, such as United States v. Lombardo,376 courts have concluded
that the sporting event or contest language is limited to individual
prohibitions within the two clauses of the statute but the statute as a whole
is more broadly applicable.377 The Lombardo decision as to the scope of
the Wire Act is nearly entirely based on a reading of the statute, and
summarily dismisses the In re Mastercard decision on the basis of the fact
that the decision was based on a prohibition within the Wire Act that
includes the sporting events or contests language, while not engaging with
the fact that the In re Mastercard decision does not delve into this
delineation between the clauses.378 Instead, the Utah District Court looks
to a New York case wherein the defendant, who operated an online casino,
was charged with a variety of state and federal counts.379 While the
Lombardo decision was correct regarding the New York v. World
Interactive Gaming Corp.380 decision to convict the defendants, the New
York state court did not address the scope of the “sporting events and
contests” language and instead focused the statute’s application to those
in the business of betting or wagering.381 Indeed, the 2018 Wire Act
memorandum suggests that at least four cases have indicated that the Wire
Act’s sporting event or contest language may apply to only a specific

374. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[t]he district court
concluded that the Wire Act concerns gambling on sporting events or contests and that the Plaintiffs
had failed to allege that they had engaged in internet sports gambling” and “agree[ing] with the district
court’s statutory interpretation, its reading of the relevant case law, its summary of the relevant
legislative history, and its conclusion”).
375. See United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 718 (1st Cir. 2014).
376. 639 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah 2007).
377. Id. at 1278–82 (noting that its analysis was not actually necessary to its determination of the
defendants’ motions as the defendants did appear to engage in some conduct that would still implicate
the Wire Act).
378. Id. at 1279–80.
379. Id. (citing New York. v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 185 Misc. 2d 852, 714 N.Y.S.2d
844 (Sup. Ct. 1999)).
380. 185 Misc. 2d 852, 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 861–62 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
381. Id.
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portion of the statute,382 but the overwhelming majority of reported cases
have dealt with bookmaking as the targeted offense.383
The legislative history of the Wire Act provides a clear indication that
the intent of the statute was to target bookmakers and layoff bettors and
not the casual gambler betting on sporting events or contests.384 There is
virtually no indication in the hearings or reports from 1961 that Congress
intended a broader range of activities to be targeted.385 The plain reading
of the statutory text has been referred to as both ambiguous386 and not
ambiguous.387 While there appears to be sufficient ambiguity that two
justice departments, and various federal district courts have reached
different conclusions as to where the sporting events and contests
language applies, this in principle should justify an examination of the
legislative history,388 which would lead to the conclusion that the Wire
Act as a whole was intended to implicate a very small segment of the
illegal gambling industry involving betting on sporting events and
contests. There is also a pressing need to address the question of what
information is used to assist in the placing of bets or wagers, particularly
as legal sports gambling expands nationwide and gaming operators and
supporting industries look to control costs.
D.

What is Information Assisting in Placing Bets or Wagers?

The Wire Act prohibits the “transmission of . . . information assisting
in the placing of bets or wagers,” but what exactly is included within

382. ENGEL MEMO, supra note 16, at 4 n.5.
383. See Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 354, at 460–61 (suggesting that in the roughly 190
reported federal decisions involving the a Wire Act conviction being upheld, the decision has involved
“bookmakers, professional gamblers, criminal organizations, or individuals associated with such
persons”).
384. See supra section II.E.
385. Legislation Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on H.R. 468, H.R. 1246, H.R. 3021, H.R.
3022, H.R. 3023, H.R. 3246, H.R. 5230, H.R. 6571, H.R. 6572, H.R. 6909, H.R. 7039 Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961); see also The Attorney General’s
Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656,
S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961).
386. See SEITZ MEMO, supra note 15, at 4–6.
387. See ENGEL MEMO, supra note 16, at 23.
388. See Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1954) (noting that even staunch supporters of the plain meaning rule recognize that
legislative history may be used to resolve ambiguity); Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing the Plain
Language Rule of Statutory Construction: How and Why, 65 MONT. L. REV. 229, 261 (2004)
(discussing a New York statute that governs statutory construction, which says that where legislation
is clear as to legislative intent, and there is not ambiguity, courts should not endeavor further; but
when it is not clear from the text, the court may be required to look into the intent of the legislature).
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“information” is an open question.389 In United States v. Scavo,390 Frank
Scavo was convicted under the Wire Act for providing a Minneapolis
bookmaker with odds and point spread information.391 Scavo appealed,
arguing, amongst other things, that there was insufficient evidence to
support a Wire Act conviction.392 The Court of Appeals rejected Scavo’s
argument, finding that the supplying of line information was sufficient to
implicate the reach of the Wire Act.393
In contrast, in United States v. Baborian,394 the defendant was accused
of both wagering and providing betting opinions on which games would
be best for a codefendant to wager on.395 The court found that Baborian
was a mere casual bettor, and Congress did not intend to criminalize the
discussion and evaluation of outcomes or opinions of sporting events
amongst friends.396 While these cases do little to elucidate the outer
boundaries of what information is within the scope of the Wire Act, it is
evident from the Scavo decision that information that enables a
bookmaker to operate, such as providing odds and betting line
information, is likely sufficient to trigger the statute.397 Merely expressing
betting predictions, on the other hand, likely does not trigger the statute.398
E.

Does the Wire Act Prohibit the Intermediate Routing of
Gambling Information?

Whether the Wire Act’s safe harbor protection exempts the so-called
intermediate routing of information is a question that has been asked more
frequently since the Murphy decision, and the doors of opportunity for
states to legalize sports betting have opened.399 The safe harbor provision
is contained within section (b) of the Wire Act and states as follows:
389. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2018). The mention of information is present in both Wire Act clauses
“information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest” and “or for
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers.” Id.
390. 593 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1979).
391. Id. at 839–40.
392. Id. at 840.
393. Id. at 841.
394. 528 F. Supp. 324 (D.R.I. 1981), rev’d sub nom, United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
395. Id. at 326.
396. Id. at 331.
397. United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 840–42 (8th Cir. 1979).
398. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. at 331.
399. See Christine Swanick, DOJ Opinion Leaves Industry Hanging: If UIGEA Exclusions Don’t
Modify the Wire Act What Does That Mean for Intrastate Gambling Transactions?, SHEPPARD
MULLIN FIN. & BANKR. L. BLOG (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.bankruptcylawblog.com/uigeaexclusions-dont-modify-wire-act.html [https://perma.cc/VZ9F-SRKJ].
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of information for
use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the
transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or foreign
country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal
into a State or foreign country in which such betting is legal.400
For example, intermediate routing occurs when data that originates in
state A, New Jersey, where the activity is legal and ends in state C,
Nevada, where the activity is also legal, passes through state B,
Washington, where the implicated activity is illegal.401 The UIGEA
exempts intermediate routing specifically, and for that reason the absence
of such a provision in the Wire Act raises concerns that there is no such
protection from intermediate routing implicating the statute.402 While not
conclusive, there is an indication in the House report that Congress
intended for intermediate routing to not be a concern.403 In explaining the
safe harbor provision, the report states:
Phrased differently, the transmission of gambling information on
a horserace from a State where betting on that horserace is legal
to a State where betting on the same horserace is legal is not
within the prohibitions of the bill. Since Nevada is the only State
which has legalized offtrack betting, this exemption will only be
applicable to it. For example, in New York State parimutuel
betting at a racetrack is authorized by State law. Only in Nevada
is it lawful to make and accept bets on the race held in the State
of New York where parimutuel betting at a racetrack is authorized
by law. Therefore, the exemption will permit the transmission of
information assisting in the placing of bets and wagers from New
York to Nevada. On the other hand, it is unlawful to make and
accept bets in New York State on a race being run in Nevada.
Therefore, the transmission of information assisting in the placing
of bets and wagers from Nevada to New York would be contrary
to the provisions of the bill. Nothing in the exemption, however,
will permit the transmission of bets and wagers or money by wire

400. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (b) (2018).
401. See DOJ Reconsiders Its View on the Wire Act – What Happens Now?, DUANE MORRIS
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/doj_reconsiders_view_wire_act_what_happen
s_now_0119.html [https://perma.cc/GBA7-LW5D].
402. See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(E) (2006) (“The intermediate routing of electronic data shall not
determine the location or locations in which a bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made.”).
403. H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 3 (1961).
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as a result of a bet or wager from or to any State whether betting
is legal in that State or not.404
The passage, while not addressing illegality in noncontiguous states,
implies that the intent was to allow for transmission that crosses through
third-party states where the activity is illegal—provided the transaction
remains unchanged in both the originating and receiving jurisdiction
where the activity is lawful.405
In Lyons, the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “the safe
harbor provision only applies to the transmission of ‘information assisting
in the placing of bets.’ The safe harbor provision does not exempt from
liability the interstate transmission of bets themselves.”406 So, while the
safe harbor may enable the transmission of information such as betting
odds and information to travel interstate between friendly jurisdictions,
the statute does not enable interstate wagering compacts, even if legal in
both the originating and receiving jurisdiction.407 The First Circuit
clarified that “the Wire Act prohibits interstate gambling without
criminalizing lawful intrastate gambling or prohibiting the transmission
of data needed to enable intrastate gambling on events held in other states
if gambling in both states on such events is lawful.”408 There is no case
directly on point addressing the intermediate routing issue. Perhaps most
informative is a case which originated in 1962.409
In United States v. Yaquinta,410 six defendants were operating a
bookmaking operation whereby the defendant, Yaquinta, would relay
horse racing information that he received by radio transmitter to others in
bookmaking shops around the state of West Virginia.411 Known to the
defendants, long distance calls were connected via an operator in Ohio,
and thus when Yaquinta placed his calls to others in West Virginia the
calls were being routed through a wire communication facility in Ohio.412
In denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Northern District of
West Virginia judge cited the congressional intent of stamping out illegal
gambling.413 This is indeed an important point of distinction as the
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 713 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. McDonough,
835 F.2d 1103, 1104–05 (5th Cir. 1988)); United States v. Bala, 489 F.3d 334, 342 (8th Cir. 2007)).
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. United States v. Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. W. Va. 1962).
410. 204 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. W. Va. 1962).
411. Id. at 277.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 278–79.
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Yaquinta defendants were engaged in illegal conduct in both West
Virginia and Ohio, which is hardly the scenario of two jurisdictions that
each have legalized an activity and a third that has not.414 The Yaquinta
and Lyons cases appear to reach different conclusions regarding the safety
of intermediate routing; in all likelihood it was not Congress’s intent to
allow pass-through states to criminalize conduct, legal at both the origin
and destination, but it appears as though an ambitious prosecutor in a state
where information passes through, particularly if there is a re-routing of
sorts, akin to operating patching together calls, there is a possibility for
exposure under the Wire Act.415
1.

Pooling

The practice of pooling player funds from multiple states is a common
practice in various forms of online gambling. It is how the Mega Millions
and Powerball lotteries are able to offer jackpots worth hundreds of
millions of dollars, effectively having a lottery that includes forty-four
states, as well as the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.416
The advantage of pooling agreements is that it allows smaller states to
offer the same types of pricing as larger states without gambling
companies being exposed to the larger risk associated with a smaller
market.417 Since prior to the 2018 Office of Legal Counsel opinion, the
agreements have been popular among states that allow online poker and
other forms of internet gambling.418 Exempting pooling from the Wire Act
for horse racing was deemed necessary to allow the sport to remain
commercially viable, as it enabled interstate simulcast racing.419
414. Id.
415. H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 3 (1961). Some states have attempted to make their own declarations
regarding the non-application of intermediate routing, though these declarations are worthless, as
states cannot legislate the scope of federal law. See, e.g., NEW JERSEY SPORTS WAGER
LAW P.L. 2018, C.33, https://www.nj.gov/lps/ge/docs/SportsBetting/SportsWageringLawPL2018c3
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX8K-DAUT].
416. See Ryan Butler, Could States Share Sports Betting Liquidity Despite Laws?, GAMBLING.COM
(Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.gambling.com/news/could-states-share-sports-betting-liquidity-despitelaws-1753100 [https://perma.cc/G46P-4Y87].
417. Tamara S. Malvin, Online Gambling and the DOJ’s Wire Act Reinterpretation, JDSUPRA (Jan.
28, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/online-gambling-and-the-doj-s-wire-act-66154
[https://perma.cc/ VZ5A-J8UC].
418. James G. Gatto, INSIGHT: Interstate Online Gambling Dealt Blow by DOJ Flip Flop on Wire
Act, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 14, 2019, 1:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-andcriminal-law/insight-interstate-online-gambling-dealt-blow-by-doj-flip-flop-on-wire-act
[https://perma.cc/GVX9-A89V].
419. Andy Faust, Thanks to the Wire Act, There is No “Shared Liquidity” in Sports Betting,
LEGAL SPORTS BETTING (June 10, 2019, 11:47 AM), https://www.legalsportsbetting.com/news/than
ks-to-the-wire-act-there-is-no-shared-liquidity-in-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/7888-JAU4].
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By virtue of accepting bets or wagers in interstate commerce, internet
gambling activities, beyond sports wagering, may face a new threat that
they were presumed safe based on the 2018 Office of Legal Counsel
memorandum.420 But by the text of the statute, the sports betting
community remains prohibited from accepting bets or wagers via
interstate wire communication facilities, as the statute’s safe harbor only
enables the interstate (or foreign) transmission of information, not the bets
and wagers themselves.421 While UIGEA exempts intermediate routing
concerns that may arise with pooling, UIGEA’s rule of construction does
not alter or modify any other state or federal law,422 leaving in place the
Wire Act’s prohibition on interstate transmission via wire communication
facility of bets or wagers, even where the betting or wagering was legal in
both jurisdictions.423
Some of the common questions regarding the scope of the Wire Act
have been analyzed in Part III. Part IV examines the application of the
Wire Act to two of the largest segments of the sports gambling industry
currently operating in interstate commerce, the daily fantasy sports
industry, and the gambling data sales industry.
IV. APPLYING THE WIRE ACT IN THE MODERN WORLD
In the nearly sixty years since the passage of the Wire Act much has
changed, not only technologically, but with respect to moral concerns
across society. Gambling is viewed less as a scourge that preys on people
than it is a viable funding mechanism for projects that are desperately

420. Id.
421. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (1994). A court has never directly addressed the issue of whether
interstate parimutuel pools trigger the Wire Act, but dicta from the Eighth Circuit suggests that such
interstate pooling may offend the statute. See Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 354, at 464–65 (“Here,
the trial record suggests that North Dakota passed the 2001 account wagering statute in an attempt to
attract interstate electronic betting. If the reach of § 1084 is as broad as its legislative history suggests,
the attempt, if successful, will violate federal law. We leave that issue to another day.” (citing United
States v. Bala, 489 F.3d 334, 342 (8th Cir. 2007)).
422. 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2006) (providing UIGEA’s rule of construction, which states that “[n]o
provision of this subchapter shall be construed as altering, limiting, or extending any Federal or State
law or Tribal-State compact prohibiting, permitting, or regulating gambling within the
United States”).
423. See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (“As we have noted, that safe
harbor excludes not only the transmission of bets, but also the transmission of betting information to
or from a jurisdiction in which betting is illegal. As a result, that provision is inapplicable here, even
if WSE had only ever transmitted betting information.”).
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needed.424 One of the first tests of the willingness of American society to
accept legalized sports betting was the rise of daily fantasy sports.425
A.

Daily Fantasy Sports and the Wire Act

The daily fantasy sports industry took the country by storm,
culminating in a massive advertising spend in 2015.426 The two major
companies, FanDuel and DraftKings, attracted hundreds of millions of
dollars of investments from venture capital firms, media partners, and
professional sports leagues.427 The two major companies offered three
prominent types of contests: (1) guaranteed prize pool contests, which
often involved thousands of contestants vying for prizes of upwards of
one million dollars in some of the largest contests;428 (2) fifty-fifty
contests, which involve a large pool of players competing against each
other (though typically fewer than a guaranteed prize pool contest) and
the top half of the pool doubles their money;429 and (3) head-to-head
contests, where two daily fantasy competitors face off against one another
directly, with the winner taking the other’s money, minus a commission
or “rake” that the website takes.430
The relevance of the Wire Act to daily fantasy sports websites is
potentially significant.431 The primary question facing the daily fantasy
sports industry, with respect to whether they have exposure under the
Wire Act, centers on whether daily fantasy sports players are making bets
and wagers.432 Daily fantasy sports appear to possess many similarities to
424. See Holden, supra note 80.
425. See John T. Holden & Simon A. Brandon-Lai, Advertised Incentives for Participation in Daily
Fantasy Sports Contests in 2015 and 2016: Legal Classification and Consumer Implications, 15 ENT.
& SPORTS L.J. 1, 2 (2017).
426. Id.
427. See Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports: A Detailed Primer
in Federal and State Gambling Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 126 (2016).
428. See John T. Holden, Will F. Green & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy, Tipping, and Wire
Fraud, 21 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 8, 9 (2017).
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. See Edelman, supra note 427, at 137.
432. See United States v. McDonough, 835 F.2d 1103, 1104 (5th Cir. 1988) (“A federal statute
makes criminal the transmission of wagers in interstate commerce. This court held in Martin v. United
States that such transmission is proscribed whether or not wagering is forbidden by the law of the
state where the bet is received. That decision determines the law of the circuit, so we affirm a
conviction for receiving bets on baseball and football games by telephone from Texas to
Massachusetts despite the lack of evidence or any charge that placing such bets in Massachusetts was
a state criminal offense.”); Nathaniel J. Ehrman, Out of Bounds?: A Legal Analysis of Pay-to-Play
Daily Fantasy Sports, 22 SPORTS L. J. 79, 89 (2015).
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some forms of sports wagering, though whether the contests’ entry fees
constitute a bet or wager likely depends on state law.433 In Texas, for
example, it violates state law if a person “makes a bet on the partial or
final result of a game or contest or on the performance of a participant in
a game or contest.”434 FanDuel and DraftKings have contended that the
fantasy sports contestant is the actual competitor, not the professional
athletes, which would generally allow for an exemption from gambling
laws and allow for competitors who pay an entry fee to compete in a
contest and win a prize, but the Texas attorney general dismissed this
assertion.435
The determination of whether an entity is a bet or wager is likely
subject to a state-by-state determination in the case of daily fantasy sports
operators; but with the congressional intent behind the Wire Act being to
aid states in enforcing their own laws, it is likely that the federal
government could act against a daily fantasy sports operator who meets a
state law definition for illegal gambling.436 Daily fantasy sports
companies have potential exposure, in particular in states that have
conclusively found the practices to be illegal. The sites that continue to
operate, in states such as Texas, are not the only entities with potential
exposure to Wire Act liability in the new world of state-regulated sports
wagering.437
B.

Data Partnerships and the Wire Act

The modern sports betting world relies on many of the same features
that bookmakers used the wire services for back in the 1950s, though
today the companies have names like Sportradar and Genius Sports.438
Sportradar’s business serves three types of customers: “bookmaking
customers and lotteries; digital and media customers; as well as leagues
433. See Holden & Brandon-Lai, supra note 425, at 2.
434. Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. KP-0057 at *9 (Jan. 19, 2016) (citing Tex. Penal Code §§ 47.01–.10),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Texas-ag-dfs-decision.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V4A3-QFY7].
435. Id.
436. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 87-588, at 2 (“The purpose of the bill, as amended, is to amend ‘Chapter
50: Gambling,’ of title 18, United States Code, with respect to the transmission of bets, wagers, and
related information, to assist the several States in the enforcement of their laws pertaining to
gambling . . . .”). There is also an essential analysis of whether the websites are in the business of
betting, which is discussed in supra section III.B.
437. See Ryan Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy Sports State-by-State Tracker, ESPN (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14799449/daily-fantasy-dfs-legal-your-state-state-state-look
[https://perma.cc/6U6A-CGB9].
438. See John Holden & Mike Schuster, The Sham of Integrity Fees in Sports Betting, 16 NYU J.L.
& BUS. 35 (2019).
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and competition organizers.”439 While both Sportradar and Genius Sports
operate integrity services that monitor for irregular betting line
movements that may indicate nefarious activity, their principal moneymaking business is selling sports data.440
The potential exposure under the Wire Act for data providers is
dependent on a number of factors, but as both companies are official data
suppliers of professional sports leagues, evaluating potential liability is
worthwhile.441 First, the locations of both the originating and receiving
groups must be analyzed. As we are most likely addressing the sale of
betting or wagering information, as opposed to bets or wagers themselves,
the Wire Act’s safe harbor appears relevant.442 While a number of states
have expressed an interest in legalizing sports wagering, only a handful
have done so, leaving many areas of the country still inhospitable to
transmit “information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers.”443 For
betting information that originates from a state that has not legalized the
type of betting fueled by the data sold from a prohibited jurisdiction, there
is a potential problem under the Wire Act.
A second point of analysis is whether it is possible for data companies
to argue that they are engaging with the data “for use in news reporting of
sporting events.”444 But this seems unlikely with respect to the delivery of
information to sportsbooks themselves,445 though it is possible that data
companies’ sales to legitimate news clients may be protected by not only
the Wire Act’s safe harbor, but also by the First Amendment.446 Unlike
the sale to legitimate news enterprises, the sale to sportsbooks is obviously
for powering a business engaged in betting or wagering.447 The most

439. Taylor Bloom, The Evolution of Sportradar, SPORTTECHIE (Jan. 26,
https://www.sporttechie.com/the-evolution-of-sportradar [https://perma.cc/HBV9-L8RK].

2017),

440. See Holden & Schuster, supra note 438, at 45, 49.
441. See Matt Rybaltowski, Shakedown Fees: NBA, MLB Demanding Nevada Sportsbooks Pay
More or Get Cut Off, SPORTSHANDLE (May 2, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/nba-mlb-demandsdata-fee-nv-sportsbooks [https://perma.cc/Y66K-PU8S].
442. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (1994).
443. Id.; see also Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where
Every State Stands, ESPN (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/theunited-states-sports-betting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization [https://perma.cc/VZG4-HPFQ].
444. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (2018).
445. See Rybaltowski, supra note 441.
446. See generally Ryan M. Rodenberg, Asa D. Brown & John T. Holden, Real-Time Data and
The First Amendment, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 63 (2015).
447. Matt Rybaltowski, Tempers Flare At Panel On Official Sports Betting Data Requirements,
SPORTSHANDLE (May 17, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/official-data-conference-panel/
[https://perma.cc/W5SU-HL94] (noting that real-time “data is the fuel that powers the in-play
[betting] engine”).
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significant question is likely whether the information being transmitted is
within the scope of the Wire Act.
Whether the Wire Act’s prohibition on the transmission of
“information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers” encapsulates the
type of data being sold to sportsbooks requires one to analyze what type
of information assists in the placing of bets or wagers.448 The impetus for
the Wire Act was to target the means by which organized crime was able
to run its bookmaking operations, notably the use of wire services that
provided scores and other information that bookmakers could use to set
and adjust the betting lines they shared with their customers.449 While the
Rhode Island District Court in Baborian opined that the sharing of
opinions on which games had value to wager on was outside the scope of
the Wire Act,450 in Scavo, the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that
suppliers of betting line information are beyond the reach of the Wire
Act.451 In another case, the supplying of betting lines and weather reports
was viewed by the Eighth Circuit as potential information assisting in
placing bets or wagers.452 In United States v. Reeder,453 the Eighth Circuit
found that the provisioning of scores and late breaking information
constituted information within the scope of the Wire Act.454 The
determinations of whether the type of information being sold by data
providers to sportsbooks and whether the safe harbor provision of the
Wire Act is triggered, are likely fact-dependent inquiries, but the scope of
which information courts have determined assist in the placing of bets or
wagers may be problematic for some companies.
V.

RE-WRITING THE WIRE ACT

The reality of modern day sports gambling is that much of it takes place
in interstate commerce and illegally.455 Indeed, the illegal sports gambling
market presents gamblers with some advantages over the legal market,
with the existence of the Wire Act likely having an impact on some of

448. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994); see supra section III.D.
449. See supra Part II.
450. United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 331 (D.R.I. 1981), rev’d sub nom. United States
v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
451. United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 1979).
452. See Truchinski v. United States, 393 F.2d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1968).
453. 614 F.3d 1179 (8th Cir. 1980).
454. Id. at 1185.
455. See Brett Smiley, How the U.S. Legal Sports Betting Business is Fundamentally
Disadvantaged, SPORTSHANDLE (Nov. 21, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/legal-sports-bettingdisadvantages/ [https://perma.cc/FH72-MA72].
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these factors.456 The expansion of legal sports gambling across the country
has brought about a need to modernize the Wire Act to better reflect
modern commerce and enable betting operators to offer products that can
be competitive with offshore operators who are illegally accepting wagers
from individuals located within the United States. The foundational
question if the Wire Act is to be left in place is what should be done to
clarify the intended scope of the statute.457 The uncertainty that has been
interjected into the Wire Act’s scope as a result of the 2018 Engel memo
has caused legislators and operators to take caution.458 While clarity over
the scope of the Wire Act would calm the gambling industry’s nerves,
certain clarifications to the statute should be considered in order to make
legal sports betting more competitive with the illegal market. Thus,
providing a viable alternative certain clarifications to the statute should be
considered.
The first consideration would be to adopt the language from the UIGEA
in regard to intermediate routing, thereby clarifying a major question mark
surrounding the Wire Act’s scope. At present, if information originating
in a state with legal sports betting like Oregon passes through states like
Washington, where sports betting currently remains illegal, the Wire Act
may be implicated even if the end destination of that information is a
jurisdiction with legal sports betting, such as Nevada.459 The adoption of
the intermediate routing language from the UIGEA would bring
consistency to federal statutes affecting sports gambling, something that
is presently lacking.460 Adding certainty to the questions surrounding the
intermediate routing of information through states like Washington,
where sports gambling remains illegal, is but one means of improving the
Wire Act for contemporary society.
There is also a need to better define what is within the scope of the term
“information.” At present, there remains a great deal of uncertainty as to
just what information is included within the “information” assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers.461 The absence of enumerated pieces of
“information” within the statute has left lawyers with questions as to what
exactly triggers this clause of the statute. While we know the transmission

456. Id.
457. See supra section III.C.
458. See A Guide to Understanding the Wire Act, PLAYUSA, https://www.playusa.com/us/wireact/ [https://perma.cc/8ZC7-DPBJ].
459. See supra section III.E.
460. See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(E) (2006) (“The intermediate routing of electronic data shall not
determine the location or locations in which a bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made.”).
461. See supra section III.D.
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of betting line information is sufficient to implicate this clause462—and
opinions on who will prevail in a game are not sufficient463—there
remains a great deal of ambiguity as to what other pieces of information
constitute “information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any
sporting event or contest.”464 An enumerated list of types of information
used by bookmakers would add certainty to the statute, perhaps inclusion
of things like: (1) betting odds; (2) injury information; (3) expected
weather; and (4) starting lineups. While many of these items would have
legitimate uses in news reporting, such activity is already protected by the
second clause of the statute.465
A more dramatic amendment to the Wire Act would be to allow for
interstate wagering in states that both allow the same types of wagers.466
The Wire Act was never intended to exist in a world with widespread
legalized sports betting, it was passed in an era when gambling was almost
wholly illegal. An amendment to the statute that allows for interstate
wagers to be placed between jurisdictions with legal wagering could
enable a more competitive betting market that is better able to compete
with the illegal market by allowing consumers to shop for better prices
before placing a wager.467 Meanwhile, allowing the Wire Act’s safe
harbor to protect bets, as well as information in assisting bets, would be
one means of combatting the illegal sports betting market, by adding
competition to the legal market likely generating better prices for
consumers. However, the most impactful change regarding the Wire Act
would not require amending the statute at all.
One of the biggest impediments to eradication of the illegal market is
the lack of enforcement of federal gambling laws.468 The lack of
462. See United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 1979).
463. United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 331 (D.R.I. 1981), rev’d sub nom. United States
v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
464. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994).
465. See id. § 1084(b).
466. Presently, the Wire Act only allows interstate transmission of information assisting in placing
of bets or wagers between legal jurisdictions. See United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 713 (1st Cir.
2014); United States v. Bala, 489 F.3d 334, 342 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. McDonough, 835
F.2d 1103, 1104–05 (5th Cir. 1988).
467. There is evidence that bookmakers exploit fans’ biases towards local teams. See David
Purdum & Doug Kezirian, The ‘Homer Effect’: A New Bookmaking Quandary, ABC NEWS (June 19,
2018),
https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/homer-effect-bookmaking-quandary/story?id=56010419
[https://perma.cc/Q8BU-AKWM].
468. See Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America: Hearing Before the Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. & Investigations Subcomm. of the H. Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong.
(2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU08/20180927/108721/HHRG-115-JU08-WstateBruningJ-20180927.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NA3-X4D4] (written testimony of Jon C. Bruning,
Managing Partner, Bruning Law Grp.).
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enforcement of gambling laws like the Wire Act has been a major
component in the proliferation of illegal gambling. This lack of
enforcement, and the seeming ubiquity of gambling that has resulted, has
led to questions being raised over the fairness of enforcing gambling laws
against anyone.469 Much of the confusion surrounding the Wire Act could
be resolved by a consistent approach to prosecuting illegal sports
gambling operations. Absent a renewed commitment to enforcement of
the statute, illegal gambling operators are likely to maintain an advantage
over legal operators, as the likelihood of there being any consequences for
their illegal actions are minimal.
As states like Washington begin to consider whether to legalize sports
gambling or even to expand their existing gambling offerings to include
online gambling, the Wire Act casts a large shadow.470 States such as
Washington, which have a large tribal gaming presence, face a difficult
challenge in passing new gambling bills as the tribes and states have
existing gaming compacts, which the authorization of a new type of
wagering activity threatens to disrupt.471 As a result of the more
complicated gaming landscape in Washington State, and others similarly
situated, it is possible that there will be some movement from the federal
government to clarify or amend the Wire Act before legal sports betting
makes its arrival.
CONCLUSION
The Wire Act, which was passed before the moon landing, is now
antiquated, having been drafted long before the internet and the
reintroduction of lotteries, which came about in 1964.472 Attempts to
regulate the current world of legalized and state-regulated sports wagering
with a statute that never endeavored to address such a world is sure to
create difficulties. The challenges facing legalized sports betting are
numerous, but chief among them is the ability to operate as a
469. See John Holden, Breaking Down The Rise and Fall of Legendz Sportsbook, Part II, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32871/legendz-sportsbook-sportsbetting-2/ [https://perma.cc/4BGE-7QTH].
470. The Washington Gambling Commission held hearings in October 2019 with one stakeholder
group and has engaged in an ongoing study of what sports gambling might look like in the state. See
John Holden, Checking Into What MLB Told Washington State Regulators, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Oct.
22, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/35707/mlb-washington-state-sports-betting/
[https://perma.cc/LG7V-N22F].
471. James Drew, Legal Sports Betting Might Be Years Away in Washington, Even as Other States Move
Ahead, OLYMPIAN (May 17, 2019), https://www.theolympian.com/latest-news/article230517364.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2020).
472. Kevin Flynn, How NH Defied the Feds, Mob and Church to Create the First State Lottery,
N.H. MAG. (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.nhmagazine.com/how-nh-defied-the-feds-mob-and-churchto-create-the-first-state-lottery [https://perma.cc/49FD-VUYS].
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commercially viable entity in states that authorize sports betting, which
may be threatened if activities like pooling offend the Wire Act.
The Wire Act’s reinterpretation by the Department of Justice in 2018
adds increased focus to the deficiencies in the statute. The legislative
history quite conclusively illustrates that neither Congress nor the authors
in the Justice Department intended a broad statute that applied far beyond
bookmakers and layoff wagering. The current interpretation appears to be
an exercise of the executive branch interpreting laws in a fashion such that
the legislative branch is removed from the process, as the 2018 Wire Act
memorandum accomplishes what Congress failed to do via RAWA.
The Wire Act will continue to be a prominent focus as online wagering
continues to expand. Unfortunately for the sports gambling industry, the
Wire Act remains a very significant obstacle to realizing the true revenue
potential of a widely legal market. Barring repeal or substantial revision,
the Wire Act casts a vast shadow over both the legal and illegal sports
gambling industries.

